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I. ELEMENTS OF PRIVATE NUISANCE
A. Definition
A private nuisance' is defined in the Restatement of Torts2 and by the
majority of states,3 including Missouri, 4 as any activity which unreason-
ably interferes with the use and enjoyment of land. Two conflicting policy
1. The law of private nuisance originated as the assise of nuisance during
the twelfth century. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
469 n.2 (5th ed. 1956). Its original purpose was to remedy interferences with land
not amounting to trespass. 3 W. HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 11
(3d ed. 1927). Indeed, if an interference amounted to a trespass it was not action-
able under the assise of nuisance. Eventually, the assise gave rise to the action of
trespass on the case and later to the modem actions of public and private
nuisance. McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1
FLA. L. REV. 27 (1948).
2. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939). There is one important dif-
ference between the Restatement and Missouri case law. The Restatement pro-
vides that a private nuisance is actionable only if the defendant's conduct is
intentional and unreasonable, or negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous. Missouri
law does not appear to impose such a requirement, and the nature of culpability
for the maintenance of a nuisance is more in the nature of strict liability. Beyond
this important distinction, both the Restatement and Missouri case law define a
private nuisance as an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
land. Both apply the same factors to determine which interferences are unreason-
able. It also should be observed that the Restatement prefers to label this area of
the law as "non-trespassory invasions of land" rather than as private nuisance.
3. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.3 (1977);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973); Crutcher v.
Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943); Rankin v. Charless, 19 Mo. 490
2
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considerations underlie this definition. 5 The courts recognize the desir-
ability of permitting landowners latitude in the use of their land and do
not wish to impose unnecessary restrictions.6 However, the courts also
recognize that there is a point at which the landowner's latitude must be
restricted so as not to unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of
surrounding land. 7 It should be observed that this definition contemplates
the protection of a wide variety of interests in land, including the present
use value, the right to enjoy the pleasures and comforts of the land, and
the right to maintain the land in the same physical condition.8 Therefore,
an interference can be unreasonable which produces either actual physical
injury to the land or which causes discomfort or annoyance to its occu-
pants.9
From time to time, Missouri courts have applied a variety of other
definitions to private nuisance. One definition adopted in several older
Missouri cases stated that a private nuisance exists if one person "injures or
annoys another in the exercise of his legal rights."10 Another stated that a
private nuisance is "anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage
(1854); Meinecke v. Stallsworth, 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972); City
of Fredericktown v. Osbom, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Clinic &
Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951);
Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947);
Lademan v. Lamb Constr. Co., 297 S.W. 184 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927).
5. See generally 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 704-707.1 (1977); W.
RODGERS, supra note 3, §§ 2.1-2.17; D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES, §§ 5.3-.5, 5.7 (1973); W. PROSSER, supra note 3, §§ 86-91; D.
HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, §§ 158-
62 (1971).
6. City of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App.
1968); Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384(K.C. 1951); Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Co., 231 Mo. App. 751, 95 S.W.2d 837
(St. L. 1936); Magel v. Gruetli Benev. Soc'y, 203 Mo. App. 335, 218 S.W. 704
(St. L. 1920); Blackford v. Heman Constr. Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287
(St. L. 1908).
7. Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943); Meinecke
v. Stallsworth, 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972); City of Fredericktown
v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. Mc-
Connell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951); Mason v. Deitering,
132 Mo. App. 26, 111 S.W. 862 (St. L. 1908).
8. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, comment e (1939).
9. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
10. Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226, 14 S.W. 746 (1890); White v. Smith,-
440 S.W.2d 497 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d
100 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951); Powell v. Brookfield Pressed Brick & Tile Mfg. Co.,
104 Mo. App. 713, 78 S.W. 646 (K.C. 1904). This definition was espoused in 3
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215, and is cited in several older treatises
including T. COOLEY, TORTS § 398, at 845 (1879), and 20 R.C.L. 380, Nuisance
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to the lands of another."" Both definitions are primarily of historical
significance today.
Another line of Missouri cases stated that the existence of a private
nuisance depends on the "degree of danger existing with the best of
care. 1 2 This phrase first appeared in Pearson v. Kansas City'" to distin-
guish negligence and nuisance and to state that negligence is not an ele-
ment of nuisance. The phrase derives from the 1918 treatise Ruling Case
Law' 4 which defined private nuisance consistently with the traditional
definition discussed earlier.' 5 The phrase "degree of danger existing with
the best of care" was advanced in Pearson and in several later cases which
had little to do with the law of private nuisance. It is possible that these
cases were applying the law of public nuisance, rather than the law of
private nuisance.' 6 In Pearson the defendant did not interfere with the use
and enjoyment of plaintiff's land; rather, the plaintiff was injured when
she fell down an open elevator shaft located on the defendant's property. 17
Similarly, in Davis v. Cities Service Oil Co. '8 the test was applied in a
wrongful death case in which the plaintiff's husband was killed when a car
fell off a lift at the defendant's service station.
The confusion in Pearson and subsequent cases appears to be the
result of a misapplication of a different section of Ruling Case Law. In
Pearson, which involved a public nuisance and not a private nuisance, the
plaintiff was seeking to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity raised by the
defendant city. One section of Ruling Case Law, upon which the court
relied, states that a city could be liable for a condition which results in an
interference with nearby land, but could not be liable for a condition
11.. Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226, 14 S.W. 746 (1890); Ellis v. Kansas
City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 63 Mo. 131 (1876); Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light
Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935); Martin v. City of St. Joseph, 136 Mo.
App. 316, 117 S.W. 94 (K.C. 1909). In Martin the court cited 3 BOUVIERS LAW
DICTIONARY 2379 (1914) as authority for this definition. Bouvier ultimately
relied on Blackstone and his commentaries for authority. 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *5, *216. T. COOLEY, supra note 10, at 670, indicated that this
definition is consistent with the traditional law of private nuisance.
12. Lentz v. Schuerman Bldg. & Realty Co., 359 Mo. 103, 220 S.W. 58
(Mo. En Banc 1949); Vogrin v. Forum Cafeterias of America, 308 S.W.2d 617
(Mo. 1957); Hinds v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. 1948); Pearson v.
Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485 (1932); White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d
497 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); Titone v. Teis Constr. Co., 426 S.W.2d 665 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1968); Rodgers v. Kansas City, 327 S.W.2d 478 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959). See
also Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943).
13. 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485 (1932).
14. 20 R.C.L. 381 (1918).
15. Id.
16. See authorities cited notes 20 & 26 infra.
17. Plaintiff was denied recovery on a nuisance theory because she pleaded
negligence rather than nuisance.
18. 131 S.W.2d 865 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939).
1979]
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which results in personal injury. 19 In making this distinction, the court
failed to state that the personal injury action would be brought on a public
rather than a private nuisance theory,2 0 while the action concerning in-
terference with land could be brought on either a private or a public
nuisance theory.
Following Pearson, a line of Missouri cases picked up the phrase that
the existence of a nuisance depends on the degree of danger existing with
the best of care and began applying it in cases which had little or nothing
to do with private nuisance law. It was applied in cases which should have
been tried on a negligence or public nuisance theory. In Vogrin v. Forum
Cafeterias of America2' the court applied the "degree of danger" test in a
case in which the plaintiff slipped and fell on the sidewalk in front of the
defendant's cafeteria. In Bodard v. Culver-Stockton College22 the phrase
was applied in a case in which the plaintiff suffered personal injury while
applying lime to the defendant's football field. In Hinds v. City of Han-
nibal23 it was applied in a case in which the plaintiff was assaulted by a
police officer. In Brown v. City of Craig24 the plaintiff's husband was killed
when the city jail in which he was incarcerated burned down. None of
these cases involved an interference by the defendant with the use and en-
joyment of the plaintiff's land; application of nuisance principles appears
to have been inappropriate. 25
The "degree of danger" cases are not explainable on traditional
private nuisance theory and, as noted earlier, it is quite possible that they
represent application of the law of public nuisance rather than the law of
private nuisance. 26 More recent Missouri cases clearly indicate that
Missouri follows the traditional definition that a private nuisance exists
19. 19 R.C.L. § 401 states:
When a piece of real estate belonging to a municipal corporation is
allowed to fall into such condition as to constitute a nuisance to adjoin-
ing property, the corporation is held liable to the same extent as a private
owner, but the exemption of municipal corporations from liability for
personal injury in connection with the conduct of public and govern-
mental functions has been held to extend to injuries arising from the un-
safe and defective condition of public buildings and other public
places....
20. See Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1196 (1931).
21. 308 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1957).
22. 471 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1971).
23. 212 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. 1948).
24. 350 Mo. 836, 168 S.W.2d 1080 (1943).
25. It is interesting to note that in these cases it was held that no nuisance ex-
isted. However, the courts did not base their decisions on traditional nuisance
principles, but rather on the principle that there was not a sufficient degree of
danger.
26. See Rodgers v. Kansas City, 327 S.W.2d 478 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959),
which imposed a requirement of special injury. Special injury is generally re-
quired in a public but not in a private nuisance action.
[Vol. 44
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when one person unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of
another person's land.27 To the extent that Pearson and the other cases
may be inconsistent therewith, they are probably not good law.
28
B. Factual Patterns
A variety of factual patterns have been alleged to constitute a private
27. Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973); Bower v. Hog
Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174
S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943); Meinecke v. Stallsworth, 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1972); City of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App.
1968); Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1955); Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d
384 (K.C. 1951); Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1947); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931); Lademan
v. Lamb Constr. Co., 297 S.W. 184 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927); Powell v. Brookfield
Pressed Brick & Tile Mfg. Co., 104 Mo. App. 713, 78 S.W. 646 (K.C. 1904).
28. It should be mentioned that several other Missouri cases have indicated
that one who harbors a vicious dog could be liable for maintaining a nuisance.
Clinkenbeard v. Reinert, 284 Mo. 569, 225 S.W. 667 (En Banc 1920); Gardner v.
Anderson, 417 S.W.2d 130 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Patterson v. Rosenwald, 222
Mo. App. 973, 6 S.W.2d 664 (K.C. 1928). As with the "degree of danger cases,"
these cases are probably applying a public rather than a private nuisance theory.
It would be unlikely, although not impossible, for a vicious dog or a dog bite to in-
volve an interest in land. Clinkenbeard, one of the early dog bite cases, did not ex-
pressly state that one who maintains a dog is liable on a public nuisance theory,
but it did state that the owner is liable on a nuisance theory because he has
violated a duty which he owes to the public by maintaining an animal which is a
menace. 284 Mo. at 576, 225 S.W. at 670. The language used would suggest a
public rather than a private nuisance basis for the decision.
1979]
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nuisance. Such intrusions as noise,29 odor,3 0 fumes,3 1 and light 32 are a fre-
quent source of nuisance litigation. However, the list of activities which
could result in a private nuisance is virtually limitless and includes race-
ways,3 3 slaughterhouses,34 coal mines, 35 industrial plants,3 6 record stores, 37
29. Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973); Crutcher v.
Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943); Rotert v. Peabody Coal Co., 513
S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Leonard v. Gagliano, 459 S.W.2d 732(K.C. Mo. App. 1970); City of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1968); White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); Clinic &
Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. Mo. App. 1951); Biggs v. Grif-
fith, 231 S.W.2d 875 (Spr. Mo. App. 1950); Magel v. Gruetli Benev. Soc'y, 203
Mo. App. 335, 218 S.W. 704 (St. L. 1920); McNultyv. Miller, 167 Mo. App. 134,
151 S.W. 208 (K.C. 1912); Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W.
1005 (K.C. 1905); Bielman v. Chicago, St. P. &K.C. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 151 (K.C.
1892).
30. Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776
(En Banc 1928); Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En
Banc 1942); Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Flanigan
v. City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962); Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc.,
539 S.W.2d 627 (Spr. Mo. App. 1976); Hunt v. Easely, 495 S.W.2d 703 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1973); Meinecke v. Stallsworth, 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1972); Leonard v. Gagliano, 459 S.W.2d 732 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970);
White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); City of Fredericktown v.
Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Clark v. City of Springfield, 241
S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951); Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co.,
279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955); Kelly v. National Lead Co., 240 Mo.
App. 47, 210 S.W.2d 728 (St. L. 1948); Sultan v. Parker-Washington Co., 117
Mo. App. 636, 93 S.W. 289 (St. L. 1906); Babb v. Curators of State University,
40 Mo. App. 173 (K.C. 1890).
31. Lederer v. Carney, 142 S.W.2d 1085 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940).
32. Leonard v. Gagliano, 459 S.W.2d 732 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970); Greene v.
Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
33. Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973); Lee v. Rolla
Speedway, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
34. White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); Zuggv. Arnold,
75 Mo. App. 68 (St. L. 1898).
35. Rotert v. Peabody Coal Co., 513 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974);
Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214 (K.C. Mo. App.
1961); Gibson v. Donk, 7 Mo. App. 37 (St. L. 1879) (coal yard).
36. Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776
(En Banc 1928); Ruppel v. Ralston Purina Co., 423 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1968);
Thompsonv. Hodge,.348 S.W.2d 11 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961); Fuchsv. Curran Car-
bonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955); Kelly v. National
Lead Co., 240 Mo. App. 47, 210 S.W.2d 728 (St. L. 1948); Bollinger v. American
Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S.W.2d 544 (K.C. 1929); Bradbury
Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594 (St. L.
1907); Sultan v. Parker-Washington Co., 117 Mo. App. 636, 93 S.W. 289 (St. L.
1904); Danker v. Goodwin Mfg. Co., 102 Mo. App. 723, 77 S.W. 338 (St. L.
1903).
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machine shops, 38 mortuaries, 39 stove pipes,40 parking lots,4" bowling
alleys,4 2 distilleries, 43 public address systems, 4 4 sewers, 45 barbecue
stands, 4 6 bawdyhouses, 47 dead animals,"4 sawmills, 49 firehouses,5 0 mud,5'
38. Ivie v. McMunigal, 66 Mo. App. 437 (K.C. 1896).
39. Street v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (En Banc 1927); Leffen
v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary, Inc., 363 Mo. 1137, 257 S.W.2d 609 (1953); Scallet
v. Stock, 363 Mo. 721, 253 S.W.2d 143 (1952); Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo.
961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202
(1924).
40. Whalen v. Keith, 35 Mo. 87 (1864).
41. Scallet v. Stock, 253 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1952); Krummenacher v.
Western Auto Supply Co., 206 S.W.2d 991 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947), aff'd in part,
358 Mo. 757, 217 S.W.2d 473 (En Banc 1949); Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Co., 231
Mo. App. 751, 95 S.W.2d 837 (St. L. 1936).
42. Magel v. Gruetli Benev. Soc'y, 203 Mo. App. 335, 218 S.W. 704 (St. L.
1920).
43. Schumacher v. Shawhan Distillery Co., 178 Mo. App. 361, 165 S.W.
1142 (K.C. 1914).
44. Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. Mo. App.
1951); Biggs v. Griffith, 241 Mo. App. 223, 231 S.W.2d 875 (Spr. 1950).
45. Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En Banc
1942); Chappel v. City of Springfield, 388 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. 1965); Flanigan v.
City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344
Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (En Banc 1939); Windle v. City of Springfield, 320
Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61 (1928); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 182 Mo. 1, 81 S.W. 165
(1904); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899); Hunt v. Ease-
ly, 495 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); Stewart v. City of Marshfield, 431
S.W.2d 819 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968); Newman v. City of El Dorado Springs, 292
S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956); Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100
(Spr. Mo. App. 1951); Barber v. School Dist. No. 51, 335 S.W.2d 527 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1960); McCleery v. City of Marshall, 65 S.W.2d 1042 (K.C. Mo. App.
1933); Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S.W.2d 571 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931); Slnner v.
City of Slater, 159 Mo. App. 589, 141 S.W. 733 (K.C. 1911); City of Chillicothe v.
Bryan, 103 Mo. App. 409, 77 S.W. 465 (K.C. 1903); Foncannon v. Kirksville, 88
Mo. App. 279 (K.C. 1901); Scott v. City of Nevada, 56 Mo. App. 189 (K.C.
1894); Bab v. Curators of State University, 40 Mo. App. 173 (K.C. 1890).
46. Deevers v. Lando, 220 Mo. App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (St. L. 1926).
47. Givens v. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149 (1885).
48. Ellis v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 63 Mo. 131 (1876); Jarvis v. St.
Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 26 Mo. App. 253 (St. L. 1887).
49. Thompson v. Hodge, 348 S.W.2d 11 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
50. Van De Vere v. Kansas City, 107 Mo. 83, 17 S.W. 695 (Mo. 1891). The
firehouse under construction in Van De Vere was being built for one fire wagon, a
span of horses, and five men. Plaintiff objected to the anticipated odor from the
horses, and the noise from the bells.
51. Schmidt v. Paul, 554 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); Frick v.
Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 488, 93 S.W. 351 (K.C. 1906). 8
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water leaks,52 dams,5 3 chemical plants,5 4 steam pipes,55 poultry, egg, and
butter houses,5 6 filling stations,5 7 barking dogs,58 spray ponds,5 9 rock
quarries, 60 breweries, '6 1 cemeteries,6 2 dairies, 63 picketing, 64 stables, 65 fac-
tories, 66 septic tanks, 67 furnaces, 68 steam shovels, 69 brick kilns, 70
52. Schindler v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 207 Mo. App. 190, 232 S.W.
735 (St. L. 1921).
53. Payne v. Kansas City, St.J. & C.B.R.R., 112 Mo. 6, 20 S.W. 322 (1892);
Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875); Webb v. Union Electric Co., 240 Mo. App.
1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C. 1949); Roth v. City of St. Joseph, 164 Mo. App. 26,
147 S.W. 490 (K.C. 1912); Nickey v. St. Louis, M. &S.E. Ry., 135 Mo. App. 661,
116 S.W. 477 (St. L. 1909); Scheurich v. South-West Mo. Light Co., 109 Mo.
App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (St. L. 1905); Markt v. Davis, 46 Mo. App. 272 (K.C.
1891).
54. Kelly v. National Lead Co., 240 Mo. App. 47, 210 S.W.2d 728 (St. L.
1948).
55. Stremph v. Loethen, 203 S.W. 238 (K.C. 1918).
56. McCracken v. Swift & Co., 265 S.W. 91 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947).
57. Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
58. City of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App.
1968).
59. Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (K.C. Mo. App.
1935).
60. Lademan v. Lamb Constr. Co., 297 S.W. 184 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927);
Northcutt v. Springfield Crushed Stone Co., 178 Mo. App. 389, 162 S.W. 747
(Spr. 1914); Krebs v. Bambrick Bros. Constr. Co., 144 Mo. App. 649, 129 S.W.
425 (Spr. 1910); Blackford v. Heman Constr. Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W.
287 (St. L. 1908); Schaub v. Perkinson Bros. Constr. Co., 108 Mo. App. 122, 82
S.W. 1094 (St. L. 1904); Berlin v. Thompson, 61 Mo. App. 234 (St. L. 1895).
61. Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (St. L. Mo. App.
1947); Beckley v. Skroh, 19 Mo. App. 75 (K.C. 1885).
62. Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286 S.W. 86
(1926); Killian v. Brith Sholom Congregation, 154 S.W.2d 387 (St. L. Mo. App.
1941); Symmonds v. Novelty Cemetery Ass'n, 21 S.W.2d 889 (St. L. Mo. App.
1929).
63. McDonough v. Robbens, 60 Mo. App. 156 (St. L. 1895).
64. Hughes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W.
202 (En Banc 1920).
65. McNulty v. Miller, 167 Mo. App. 134, 151 S.W. 208 (K.C. 1912).
66. Danker v. Goodwin Mfg. Co., 102 Mo. App. 723, 77 S.W. 338 (St. L.
1903); Thomas v. Concordia Cannery Co., 68 Mo. App. 350 (K.C. 1897).
67. Johnson v. Independent School Dist., 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d
421 (Spr. 1947).
68. Berlin v. Thompson, 61 Mo. App. 234 (St. L. 1895).
69. Jackson v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 219 Mo. App. 689, 284 S.W. 826
(St. L. 1926).
70. Powell v. Brookfield Pressed Brick & Tile Mfg. Co., 104 Mo. App. 713,
78 S.W. 646 (K.C. 1904); Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 Mo. App. 59 (St. L. 1894).
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vibration, 71 overhanging tree branches,7 2 easement obstructions, 73
blasting,74 pollution, 75 surface water discharges and flooding,76 stream
71. Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943); Chamber-
lin v. Missouri Elec. & Power Co., 158 Mo. 1, 57 S.W. 1021 (1900) (defendant
constructed a power house with engines which it operated night and day; the
attendant vibration damaged plaintiff's home).
72. Tanner v. Wallbrunn, 77 Mo. App. 262 (K.C. 1898).
73. MacCormick v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Whalen v.
Keith, 35 Mo. 87 (1864); St. Louis Safe Deposit & Sav. Bank v. Kennett Estate,
101 Mo. App. 370, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903); Hulett v. Missouri, Kan. & Tex.
Ry., 80 Mo. App. 87 (K.C. 1899).
74. Rotertv. Peabody Coal Co., 513 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974);
Schaefer v. Frazier-Davis Constr. Co., 125 S.W.2d 897 (St. L. 1939); Northcutt v.
Springfield Crushed Stone Co., 178 Mo. App. 389, 162 S.W. 747 (Spr. 1914);
Krebs v. Bambrick Bros. Constr- Co., 144 Mo. App. 649, 129 S.W. 425 (Spr.
1910); Blackford v. Heman Constr. Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L.
1908); Schaub v. Perkinson Bros. Constr. Co., 108 Mo. App. 122, 82 S.W. 1094
(St. L. 1904); Berlin v. Thompson, 61 Mo. App. 234 (St. L. 1895).
75. Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En Banc
1942); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939); Shelley
v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931); Windle v. City of
Springfield, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61 (1928); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 182 Mo.
1, 81 S.W. 165 (1904); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899);
Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 331 (1848); Stewart v. City of Marshfield, 431
S.W.2d 819 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968); Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co.,
351 S.W.2d 214 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961); Newman v. City of El Dorado Springs,
292 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956); Divelbiss v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 272
S.W.2d 839 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1931); Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19
S.W.2d 544 (K.C. 1929); Symmonds v. Novelty Cemetery Ass'n, 21 S.W.2d 889
(St. L. Mo. App. 1929); Schumacher v. Shawhan Distillery Co., 178 Mo. App.
361, 165 S.W. 1142 (K.C. 1914); Roth v. City of St.Joseph, 164 Mo. App. 26, 147
S.W. 490 (K.C. 1912); Skinner v. City of Slater, 159 Mo. App. 589, 141 S.W. 733
(K.C. 1911); Haynor v. City of Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water
Co., 129 Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. 1908); Bradbury Marble Co. v.
Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594 (St. L. 1908); Martinowsky
v. City of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70 (St. L. 1889). See also Davis, Groundwater
Pollution: Case Law Theories for Relief, 39 MO. L. REV. 117-63 (1974);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 832 (1939).
76. Hawkins v. Burlington N., Inc., 514 S.W.2d 593 (En Banc 1974);
Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Somerset Villa, Inc. v.
City of Lee's Summit, 436 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1968); Payne v. Kansas City, St. J. &
C.B.R.R., 112 Mo. 6, 20 S.W. 322 (1892); Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226, 14
S.W. 746 (1890); Dickson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 71 Mo. 575 (1880);
Wayland v. St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., 75 Mo. 548 (1882); Genova v. City of
Kansas City, 497 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973); Spain v. City of Cape
Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Proper v. City of Inde-
pendence, 328 S.W.2d 55 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959); Blydenburgh v. Amelung, 309
S.W.2d 150 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958); Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100
(Spr. Mo. App. 1957); Divelbiss v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 272 S.W.2d 839 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1954); Hayes v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 177 Mo. App. 201, 162 S.W. 266
(Spr. 1913); Nickey v. St. Louis, M. & S.E.R.R., 135 Mo. App. 661, 116 S.W.
477 (St. L. 1909); Martin v. City of St. Joseph, 136 Mo. App. 316, 117 S.W. 94
1979]
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obstructions,77 property access obstructions, 7 8 gasoline storage, 7 9 stagnant
water,8 0 horse breeding,8 ' the keeping of cattle, 2 stockyards, 83 and the
keeping of pigs.8 4
C. Distinguished from Other Actions
1. Public Nuisance
The breadth and flexibility of the law of private nuisance create an
overlap with several causes of action. The most obvious connection is with
the law of public nuisance which is defined as any activity which is injuri-
ous to the health, welfare or morals of society.8 6 Frequently, an activity
which constitutes a private nuisance will also constitute a public nui-
(K.C. 1909); Gleason v. City of Kirksville, 136 Mo. App. 521, 118 S.W. 120 (K.C.
1909); Graves v. St. Louis, M. & S.E. Ry., 133 Mo. App. 91, 112 S.W. 736 (St. L.
1908); Frick v. Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 488, 93 S.W. 351 (K.C. 1906); Bunten
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 414 (K.C. 1892); Markt v. Davis, 46
Mo. App. 272 (K.C. 1891); Freudenstein v. Heine, 6 Mo. App. 287 (St. L. 1878).
77. Proper v. City of Independence, 328 S.W.2d 55 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959);
Irminger v. Wabash Ry., 203 S.W. 660 (K.C. Mo. App. 1918); Nickey v. St.
Louis, M. & S.E. Ry., 135 Mo. App. 661, 116 S.W. 477 (St. L. 1909).
78. Titone v. Teis Constr. Co., 426 S.W.2d 665 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968);
Smith v. Kansas City, St.J. & C.B. Ry., 98 Mo. 20, 11 S.W. 259 (1889); Frick v.
Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 488, 93 S.W. 351 (K.C. 1906); Hulett v. Missouri,
Kan. & Tex. Ry., 80 Mo. App. 87 (K.C. 1899); McGowan v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,
23 Mo. App. 203 (K.C. 1886).
79. City of Spickardsville v. Terry, 274 S.W.2d 21 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954);
Harper v. Standard Oil Co., 178 Mo. App. 338 (St. L. 1899) (held not a nuisance
to store gasoline near a railroad terminal).
80. Bungenstock v. Nishnabotna Drainage Dist., 163 Mo. 198, 64 S.W. 149
(1901); Leonard v. Gagliano, 459 S.W.2d 732 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970); Roth v.
City of St. Joseph, 164 Mo. App. 26, 147 S.W. 490 (K.C. App. 1912); Gleason v.
City of Kirksville, 136 Mo. App. 521, 118 S.W. 120 (K.C. 1909); Graves v. St.
Louis, M. & S.E. Ry., 133 Mo. App. 91, 112 S.W. 736 (St. L. 1908).
81. Haydenv. Tucker, 37 Mo. 214(1866); McNultyv. Miller, 167 Mo. App.
134, 151 S.W. 208 (K.C. 1912).
82. Schumacher v. Shawhan Distillery Co., 178 Mo. App. 361, 165 S.W.
1142 (K.C. 1914).
83. Laird v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 78 Mo. App. 273 (St. L. 1899); Bielman
v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 141 (K.C. 1892).
84. Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Smiths v.
McConathy, 11 Mo. 331 (1848); Meinecke v. Stallsworth, 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1972); Schumacher v. Shawhan Distillery Co., 178 Mo. App. 361,
165 S.W. 1142 (K.C. 1914).
85. See State ex rel. Renfrow v. Service Cushion Tube Co., 274 S.W. 491
(K.C. Mo. App. 1929). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 88; D. HAGMAN,
supra note 5, at 289, § 158. The distinction had arisen by the sixteenth century. 7
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 424.
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sance. 86 In Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Engineering Co. ,87 defend-
ant's coal testing plant, which emitted gas and fumes, was held to con-
stitute both a private and a public nuisance. 88 Similarly, in City of
Spickardsville v. Terry,89 a gasoline storage tank was alleged to constitute
both types of nuisance.
Generally, a private individual does not have standing to bring a
public nuisance action. Rather, it can only be brought by the attorney
general or local prosecutor. A private individual will nonetheless be en-
titled to bring a public nuisance action if he can establish that he has suf-
fered injury which is greater, in kind and degree, than that suffered by the
public in general.90 In Givens v. Van Studdiford,91 plaintiff sought
damages for the maintenance of a bawdyhouse. The court held that plain-
tiff was able to establish the requisite injury by demonstrating that he had
suffered loss of rents. Although frequently the requirement of special in-
jury can be satisfied when the offending activity creates a private nuisance,
it should be remembered that the private nuisance action can be main-
tained whether or not a public nuisance action is pursued.
2. Trespass
An activity which constitutes a private nuisance might also result in a
trespass. 92 A trespass is defined as an unauthorized physical intrusion onto
the land of another.9 3 The overlap between private nuisance and trespass
is well illustrated by the holding in Blackford v. Heman Construction Co. 94
Defendant's blasting cast rocks and other debris onto plaintiff's property
resulting in a trespass. The blasting also created noise, dirt, dust, and vir-
bration which the court found to produce a private nuisance. Plaintiff was
therefore entitled to sue on alternate theories.
It is nonetheless important to recognize that the action for private
nuisance is independent of and can exist without a trespass. A mortuary
constructed in a residential neighborhood does not intrude upon nearby
land, and necessarily cannot produce a trespass. Yet it can unreasonably
86. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899); Hayden v.
Tucker, 37 Mo. 214 (1866). See also Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co.,
279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955); City of Spickardsville v. Terry, 274
S.W.2d 21 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954); D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 158.
87. 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
88. The public nuisance suit was a separate suit filed by the city officials.
89. 274 S.W.2d 21 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954).
90. Givens v. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149 (1885); Cambest v. McComas
Hydroelectric Co., 212 Mo. App. 325, 245 S.W. 598 (K.C. 1922); Schoen v.
Kansas City, 65 Mo. App. 134 (K.C. 1896).
91. 86 Mo. 149 (1885).
92. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 704; W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89. See
also Tanner v. Wallbrunn, 77 Mo. App. 262 (K.C. 1898).
93. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
94. 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1908).
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interfere with the use and enjoyment of nearby homes by creating a con-
stant reminder of death. Hence, it could result in a private nuisance.9 5
There is a potential conflict between private nuisance and trespass
theories in surface water discharge cases. Missouri follows the common
enemy doctrine in regard to surface water; a landowner has the right to
deal with the surface water on his land as he sees fit, regardless of the injury
which may occur to others.9 6 Missouri has, however, modified this doctrine
with the "due care," 97 "collection and discharge,"9 8 and "natural drain-
way"9 9 modifications.1 00 Private nuisance theory may provide a method to
circumvent the harshness of the common enemy doctrine. Under nuisance
law, a landowner need only demonstrate that the surface water discharge
creates an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of his
land. 101 An important question, therefore, is whether "unreasonableness"
will be defined with reference to the common enemy doctrine, subject to
modification, or defined with reference only to the traditional factors con-
sidered in a private nuisance action. 0 2 If the latter, it is possible that a dif-
ferent result will be reached than under the common enemy doctrine. In
effect, it may be possible to emasculate the common enemy doctrine by
litigating surface water discharge cases on private nuisance rather than
trespass theory.10 3 In Hawkins v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 1 0 4 the court
held that the increased discharge of surface water in destructive quantities
onto a subservient estate would give rise to an action on both surface water
95. See Street v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (En Banc 1924). See
also Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940); Tureman v.
Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924).
96. Hawkins v. Burlington N., Inc., 514 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. En Banc 1974);
Miller Land Co. v. Liberty Township, 510 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. En Banc 1974);
Wells v. State Highway Comm'n, 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973).
97. Under the due care modification, a landowner who improves his land is
liable for surface water damage to adjoining land if he acts negligently or without
reasonable care. Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884).
98. The collection and discharge modification states that a landowner may
not collect surface water on his land and discharge it onto his neighbor's land in
increased and destructive quantities. Borgman v. Florissant Dev. Co., 515
S.W.2d 189 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
99. The natural drainway exception states that a landowner may not dis-
charge surface water onto adjoining land, by means of artificial drainways, in
such a manner as to increase and accelerate the flow of surface water. Haferkamp
v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958).
100. See Bridges, The Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban Areas,
42 Mo. L. REV. 76 (1977).
101. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 833 (1939).
102. See text accompanying note 165 infra.
103. Professors Harper and James take the position that when the law of
private nuisance overlaps with other principles of tort law, then the latter and
more specific theory should be applied. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 1.23 (1956).
104. 514 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
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and nuisance theories. The court left unanswered the question whether a
nuisance action would sustain recovery when the discharge was insufficient
to invoke liability under the common enemy doctrine. It seemed to infer,
however, that private nuisance theory would be defined consistently with
the common enemy doctrine.
3. Riparian Rights
The law of private nuisance also can be invoked to protect riparian
rights. A riparian is one who owns land which touches upon or is bounded
by a stream.1 05 By virtue of his status, a riparian has the right to have the
stream flow'05 in its natural course both as to volume and purity except as
affected by the reasonable use of other riparians.107 However, an inter-
ference which sufficiently affects the volume and purity of a stream might
also create an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
land. For instance, a dam'08 or bridge' 0 9 may impede the flow of surface
water in a stream and cast it upon adjoining land. Alternatively, a polluted
stream may create odors which unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment
of riparian land.10 In either instance, the interference may be remediable
on either private nuisance or riparian theory. Those whose property does
not border a stream are, of course, not able to bring riparian actions and
are relegated to the nuisance remedy."'
4. Federal Law
It should also be mentioned that there are a variety of state and federal
statutes which overlap, and which may preempt, the common law of
105. Armstrong v. Westroads Dev. Co., 380 S.W.2d 529 (St. L. Mo. App.
1964). See also Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35 MO. L. REV. 1 (1970).
106. Riparian rights only accrue as to streams which flow in a particular
direction and have a definite channel, with banks and sides, and which usually
discharge into some other stream or body of water. Dudley Special Road Dist. v.
Harrison, 517 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974). It need not flow continu-
ally, but must amount to more than mere surface drainage. Id.
107. Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1963).
108. See Webb v. Union Electric Co., 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13
(K.C. 1949); Scheurich v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W.
1003 (St. L. 1905).
109. See Payne v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 112 Mo. 6, 20 S.W. 322
(1892); Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875); Kelso v. C.B.K. Agronomics, Inc.,
510 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Nickey v. St. Louis, M. & S. Ry., 135
Mo. App. 661, 116 S.W. 477 (St. L. 1909).
110. See Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En
Banc 1942); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939);
Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214 (K.C. Mo. App.
1961); Newman v. City of El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App.
1956). Pollution might also constitute a public nuisance. See D. HAGMAN, supra
note 5, § 159.
111. See authorities cited note 75 supra.
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private nuisance. There is an abundance of legislation relating to pollu-
tion: the Federal Water Quality Act of 1965;112 the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969; 113 the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act; 11 4 the Missouri Clean Water Act of 1973;115 the Fish
and Wildlife Act of 1956;1 6 and other statutes which are beyond the scope
of this comment." 7 It is important to be aware of these statutes and their
availability as an alternative remedy.
Outside the statutory area, it is important to note the case of Illinois v.
Milwaukee decided in 1972 by the United States Supreme Court.""8 There
the Court held that federal common law would govern cases involving
pollution of interstate waters and their tributaries. The potential impact
of this decision on state law remedies for pollution, particularly private
nuisance, is unknown. 11 9 It may well preempt private causes of action for
nuisance; private persons may be able to invoke federal common law to
protect their property interests in these cases. 120 In any event, the case may
be significant in any action involving pollution of interstate waterways.' 2'
D. Requirement of an Interest in Land
Consistently with the Restatement 22 and the majority of states, 123 a
prerequisite to the maintenance of a private nuisance action in Missouri is
that the plaintiff hold an interest in land with which the defendant is inter-
fering.1 24 In Ellis v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R. ,125 the
112. PUB. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61.
114. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1371.
115. RSMo §§ 204.006-.141 (1969).
116. 16 U.S.C. § 742a.
117. P. DAVIs & J. CUNNINGHAM, MISSOURI STATE LAWS PERTAINING TO
WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES (1977).
118. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 68 n.38 (3d ed. 1976).
119. See W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.12.
120. Id.
121. See Comment, The Expansion of Federal Common Law and Federal
Question Jurisdiction to Interstate Pollution, 10 Hous. L. REv. 121 (1972). A
good discussion of the impact of the decision is contained in W. RODGERS, supra
note 3, § 2.12.
122. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 823 (1939).
123. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
124. Ellis v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 63 Mo. 131 (1876); Fuchs v.
Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955);
Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 129 Mo. App. 961
(K.C. 1908). See also Newman v. City of Eldorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1956); MO. APPROVED INSTR. No. 22.06. For a historical perspective,
see 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 830-31.
125. Ellis v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 63 Mo. 131 (1876).
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plaintiff occupied land with her husband who held a periodic tenancy.126
Defendant's locomotive struck and killed a horse which was then permitted
to lie near the tracks and decompose in close proximity to the plaintiff's
home. The resulting odor caused plaintiff to become ill. Subsequently, she
brought a private nuisance action against the defendant railroad to
recover for her injuries. The court, although noting that plaintiff's hus-
band as a month-to-month tenant was entitled to maintain a private
nuisance action for her injuries, held that plaintiff was not entitled to
recover on a private nuisance theory because she did not hold an interest in
the land.1 27
The interest in land requirement is construed rather loosely, and can
be satisfied by the ownership of an easement,1 28 periodic tenancy,' 29 or
tenancy at will. 130 In Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Engineering Co. ,131
plaintiff was a month-to-month tenant of premises on which he lived and
operated a tavern. The court held that plaintiff's interest was sufficient to
entitle him to maintain a private nuisance action for his injuries. 132
It should be noted, however, that since one is only entitled to bring a
private nuisance action if there is an injury to an interest in land,' 33
recovery should be limited to the extent of injury to that interest. 134 Ac-
cordingly, the holder of a month-to-month tenancy will not be permitted
to recover damages for injury to the freehold, although he will be entitled
to recover for any injury, inconvenience or discomfort which he may have
suffered. Similarly, one who owns mineral rights in land cannot recover for
an interference which does not affect such rights.'3 5
As stated in Ellis, one who holds an interest in land is entitled to
recover for injuries, discomfort or inconvenience suffered by his family as a
126. Although private nuisance actions almost invariably arise between
neighboring landowners, there appears to be no requirement that defendant own
an interest in land. For example, repeated phone calls can constitute a nuisance.
Wiggins v. Moskins Credit Clothing Store, 137 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.S.C. 1956);
Brillhardt v. Ben Tipp, Inc., 48 Wash. 2d 722, 297 P.2d 232 (1956).
127. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
128. St. Louis Safe Deposit & Say. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App.
370, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903).
129. Ellis v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 63 Mo. 131 (1876); Fuchs v.
Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955). See
also W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.3.
130. See Newman v. City of El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1956).
131. 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
132. The Restatement view would protect any possessor of land, even an
adverse possessor. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 823, comment b (1939).
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result of the nuisance.3 6 In McCracken v. Swift & Co., 131 plaintiff owned a
dwelling house in which he resided with his wife and family. Nearby, the
defendant operated a poultry, egg and butter house which created odors,
noise and filth and caused discomfort to plaintiff and his family. Although
neither plaintiff nor his family suffered actual physical injury as a result of
defendant's operation, the court held that plaintiff, as owner of the
premises, could recover for their inconvenience and discomfort. 13 8
It may be desirable for Missouri courts to expand the interest in land
requirement to permit occupants or licensees to recover on a private
nuisance theory.1 39 Members of the owner's family can suffer severe dis-
comfort from a nuisance, but they hold no interest in the land and cannot
seek redress on a private nuisance theory. For instance, a minor child or
elderly parent of the owner may be a permanent resident of the household
and yet have no ability to enjoin or recover damages for a private nuisance.
For another example, a university professor would be a licensee in the use
of his office and therefore have no rights under private nuisance theory. If
a loudspeaker from a nearby commercial establishment substantially in-
terfered with the use and enjoyment of his office, he would effectively be
without remedy. The alternative of proceeding through university chan-
nels to attempt to prompt the university to seek abatement of the nuisance
seems impracticable. It would be much more practical to allow the pro-
fessor to pursue, in his own right, a private nuisance action against the
commercial establishment. A resident of a nursing home would also be a
mere licensee; if a sewer outside his window were to overflow and create a
horrible stench, it would seem entirely reasonable to permit him to bring a
private nuisance action either to abate the interference or to seek damages.
If the interference affects only his room, then nursing home officials might
be extremely reluctant to undertake the expense and burden of litigating
the matter. The resident may only be a licensee, but his interest would,
upon these circumstances, appear to be sufficient to justify allowing him to
maintain the action. It should be noted, however, that licensees should be
limited to a suit to enjoin 40 the nuisance or to seek damages for their dis-
136. In Ellis, the court stated that the possessor of the house must establish
three elements in order to recover: possession of the house; an injurious act by the
defendant; and injury resulting therefrom. 63 Mo. at 136.
137. 265 S.W. 91 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924). See also Smith v. City of Sedalia,
182 Mo. 1, 81 S.W. 165 (1904).
138. The court in Ellis also rejected plaintiff's contention that she survived to
her husband's cause of action following his death. 63 Mo. at 136.
139. See W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.3; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra
note 103, § 1.30.
140. However, in Clarke v. Thatcher, 9 Mo. App. 436 (1881), the court held
that a permanent injunction could not be issued at the request of a month-to-
month tenant. The court noted that his tenancy might terminate at any time and
it would be inequitable to permit him to obtain a perpetual restraint against the
defendant. It is questionable whether Clarke would be followed today.
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comfort or annoyance. They should not be able to recover for a greater in-
terest such as damages to the freehold.14 1
E. Categories of Private Nuisance
1. Introduction
In the majority of states, the courts have divided the law of private
nuisance into two categories. 142 The first category embraces those activ-
ities which always constitute a private nuisance regardless of the manner in
which they are conducted, and hence are a nuisance at law or per se. 143
The second category encompasses those activities which are not a nuisance
in and of themselves, but rather become a nuisance because of the manner
in which they are conducted. 4 4 This latter type of nuisance is referred to as
a nuisance in fact. The nuisance per se classification substantially dimin-
ishes the plaintiff's burden of proof; he need only establish that the defen-
dant's conduct is classified within one of the categories denominated as a
nuisance per se, and the court will presume that the activity is unreason-
able. 145 In the nuisance in fact category, on the other hand, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct does in fact result in an
unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land.
2. Nuisance Per Se
The nuisance per se category can be further subdivided into those ac-
tivities which are unlawful, and thus qualify as a nuisance per se irrespec-
tive of their location, 1 46 and those activities which are a nuisance per se
only when located in a residential area.' 41 The latter category has been
141. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
142. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 158.
143. Id. See also W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.7.
144. See W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.7.
145. See generally Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary Co., 363 Mo. 1137,
257 S.W.2d 609 (1953); Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119
(1940); Whipple v. McIntyre, 69 Mo. App. 397 (St. L. 1897).
146. See Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d
776 (En Banc 1928); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924);
Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594
(St. L. 1908).
147. Street v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (En Banc 1924). See also
Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary Co., 363 Mo. 1137, 257 S.W.2d 609 (1953);
Scallet v. Stock, 363 Mo. 721, 253 S.W.2d 143 (1952); Clutter v. Blankenship,
346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263
S.W. 202 (1924); Deevers v. Lando, 220 Mo. App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (St. L.
1926); Whipple v. McIntyre, 69 Mo. App. 397 (St. L. 1897). But see Greene v.
Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
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held, in some states, to include the location of a funeral home, 4 a public
parking garage,149 or a service station'5" in a residential area.
Although Missouri courts have recognized the nuisance per se cate-
gory,15 they have been extremely reluctant to categorize activities there-
in. 5 2 Missouri courts have recognized that some activities which are
unlawful constitute a nuisance per se,' 53 but they have been slow to
recognize the second category of nuisance per se, those activities which
become a nuisance per se only when located in a residential area. One
notable exception is Whipple v. McIntyre, 154 holding that the location of a
pigpen in close proximity to a dwelling house is a nuisance per se. In addi-
tion, a number of Missouri cases have held, in effect, that certain activities
are a nuisance per se when located in a residential area. For example, a
funeral parlor located in a residential area is a nuisance without regard to
the manner of its operation or the sanitariness thereof. 55
148. Jack v. Torrant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A.2d 705 (1950).
149. Prendergast v. Walls, 257 Pa. 547, 101 A. 826 (1917) (several churches
in close proximity).
150. Sprout v. Levinson, 298 Pa. 400, 148 A. 511 (1930); Carneyv. Penn. Oil
Co., 291 Pa. 371, 140 A. 133 (1928).
151. Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776
(En Banc 1928). See also Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo.
1943); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924); Clinic & Hosp.,
Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951); Killian v.
Brith Sholom Congregation, 154 S.W.2d 387 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941); Greene v.
Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931); Symmonds v. Novelty Cemetery
Ass'n, 21 S.W.2d 889 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929); Lademan v. Lamb Constr. Co.,
297 S.W. 184 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924).
152. Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (1943) (bakery);
Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776 (En Banc
1928) (ice house); Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286
S.W. 86 (1926) (cemetery); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202
(1924) (funeral home); City of Spickardsville v. Terry, 274 S.W.2d 21 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1954) (gasoline tanks); Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App.
223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951) (loudspeaker); Biggs v. Griffith, 231 S.W.2d
875 (Spr. Mo. App. 1950) (public address system); Schott v. Appleton Brewery
Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947) (brewery); Killian v. Brith Sholom
Congregation, 154 S.W.2d 387 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941) (cemetery); Greene v.
Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931) (filling station); Symmonds v.
Novelty Cemetery Ass'n, 21 S.W.2d 889 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929) (cemetery);
Deevers v. Lando, 220 Mo. App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (St. L. 1926) (barbecue
stand); Lademan v. Lamb Constr. Co., 297 S.W. 184 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927)
(rock quarry); Mason v. Deitering, 132 Mo. App. 26, 111 S.W. 862 (St. L. 1908)
(livery stable); Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 96,
106 S.W. 594 (St. L. 1908) (manufacturing plant).
153. See Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d
776 (En Banc 1928); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924);
Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594
(St. L. 1908).
154. 69 Mo. App. 397 (St. L. 1897).
155. Leffenv. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary Co., 363 Mo. 1137, 257 S.W.2d 609
(1953); Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940); Street v.
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Those cases which treat as a nuisance per se the location of a funeral
home in a residential area have evidenced difficulty in defining "residen-
tial area. 1 56 In Clutter v. Blankenship,15 7 plaintiffs lived in what was pre-
dominately a residential area; within two blocks of their home, there were
a filling station and a funeral home. When defendant sought to build a
second funeral home in the area, plaintiff sought and obtained an injunc-
tion on the basis that the location of a funeral home in a residential area
constitutes a nuisance. The court determined that the area was primarily
residential and enjoined defendant's construction of a funeral home not-
withstanding the location of an existing funeral home in the area.1 58 A
similar result was reached in Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary Co. ;159
the court held that a residential area undergoing transition to a commer-
cial area would be granted the same protections as any other residential
area. A more restrictive definition was adopted in Scallet v. Stock.160 In the
immediate area surrounding plaintiff's residence, there was a major
thoroughfare, sixty feet in width, as well as a restaurant, a bottled goods
store, a beauty parlor, an auto agency and five other stores or shops. There
were also numerous other single and multiple family dwellings. The court
declined to characterize the area as residential, and refused to apply the
traditional prohibition against the location of a funeral parlor in a residen-
tial area.
In general, it should be noted that most courts take a protective atti-
tude toward property which is used for residential purposes.16 So, as in
Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 708, 291 S.W. 494, 498 (En" Banc 1927). In Street the
court stated that:
We conclude that the rule must be considered as well settled, that when
the prosecution of a business, of itself. lawful, in a strictly residential
district, impairs the enjoyment of homes in the neighborhood, and in-
fringes upon the well being and comfort of the ordinary, normal indi-
vidual residing therein, the carrying on of such business, in such locality,
becomes a nuisance and may be enjoined.
See also D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 160 at 291. But see text accompanying notes
313-14 infra.
156. The determination can often turn upon how the court defines the
geographic area. See Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary, Inc., 363 Mo. 1137,
257 S.W.2d 609 (1953).
157. 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940).
158. A factor which is employed to determine whether a particular inter-
ference is unreasonable is the suitability of the conduct to the surrounding area.
Accordingly, if there are several other funeral homes in the area, it is less likely
that the plaintiff will suffer severe injury from the location of this funeral home in
the area. Since the primary objection to the location of a funeral home in a
residential area is that it will create feelings of gloom and morbidness, once those
feelings have already been created by the location of one funeral home in the
area, it is questionable that injury of that type will result from the operation of
one more.
159. 363 Mo. 1137, 257 S.W.2d 609 (1953).
160. 363 Mo. 721, 253 S.W.2d 143 (1952).
161. See Street v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (En Banc 1927);
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Clutter and Leffen, it is probably safe to assume that in a borderline case
the courts will characterize an area as residential if available evidence per-
mits. However, as demonstrated by Scallet, at some point the number of
commercial establishments in an area will force the court to characterize
the area as commercial. It should also be noted that, given the tendency of
the courts to adopt a protective attitude toward property used for residen-
tial purposes, it will often make very little difference in the ultimate out-
come of the case whether the location of a funeral home in a residential
area is attacked as a nuisance per se or one in fact; either action will suc-
ceed.
It is important to note that the nuisance per se characterization can
have the same effect as zoning laws. 162 As noted earlier, courts are quite
willing to enjoin the operation of a commercial or farming establishment
which is located in a residential area. In so doing, the courts do not imply
that such activities are socially undesirable. 163 To the contrary, commer-
cial and farming establishments are fundamental and necessary to society.
The courts are indicating that it is impermissible to locate such establish-
ments in a residential area. Hence, if the business is relocated to an area
which complies which the court's "zoning" requirements, then it will be
considered socially acceptable and no longer a nuisance. 164
3. Nuisance in Fact
a. Generally
In the nuisance in fact classification, the determination must be made
whether the defendant's conduct is, in fact, unreasonable. Missouri courts
Biggs v. Griffith, 231 S.W.2d 875 (Spr. Mo. App. 1950); Deevers v. Lando, 220
Mo. App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (St. L. 1926); McNulty v. Miller, 167 Mo. App. 134,
151 S.W. 208 (K.C. 1912); Zuggv. Arnold, 75 Mo. App. 68 (St. L. 1898). See also
Mason v. Deitering, 132 Mo. App. 26, 111 S.W. 862 (St. L. 1908); Blackford v.
Heman Constr. Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1908); Sultan v.
Parker-Washington Co., 117 Mo. App. 636, 93 S.W. 289 (St. L. 1906). But see
Scallet v. Stock, 253 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1952); City of Spickardsville v. Terry, 274
S.W.2d 21 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954); Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d
917 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947). In McCracken v. Swift & Co., 212 Mo. App. 558,
566, 250 S.W. 953, 955 (Spr. 1923), the court stated:
A man's home is his castle, and he should be as much entitled to protec-
tion against foul stenches, loud and unusual noises, and the torment of
flies which cause physical discomfort and suffering as against the armed
invader who would plunder and destroy.
162. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 5 (1973); D.
HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 158. Indeed, it has been asserted that nuisance law was,
in effect, the common law method of zoning. See W. RODGERS, supra note 3,§ 2.6. See also 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 103, § 1.24.
163. The relationship of nuisance theory to zoning laws is discussed in
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
164. In Deevers v. Lando, 220 Mo. App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (St. L. 1926), the
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will weigh and balance a number of factors to aid them in making the
determination that a particular activity is being conducted in an unrea-
sonable manner. These factors include the extent and frequency of the in-
jury to the plaintiff's property, the nature of the use to which plaintiff's
property is being put, and the effect of the interference upon the enjoy-
ment of life, health, property and the like. 6 5 Although these factors are
often cited by Missouri courts, and although they have a significant impact
on the outcome of most private nuisance cases, it is rare that a Missouri
court will expressly weigh and balance them or consider their interrela-
tionship. 6 6 The courts usually reach a result which, although based on
these factors, is without express consideration of them.
The factors considered by Missouri courts are similar to the factors
adopted by the Restatement of Torts,167 and include the extent of the
harm to the plaintiff's property, the social value which the law attaches to
the type of use or enjoyment invaded, the suitability of the particular use
or enjoyment to the character of the locality, and the difficulty to the per-
son harmed of avoiding the harm.1 68 Two Missouri appellate courts have
cited and, at least in part, 169 followed the factors expressed in the Restate-
ment, 170 and recently, in Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc. , the Missouri
Supreme Court followed the Restatement. In addition, the Restatement is
cited by the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions as correctly stating
private nuisance law in Missouri. 172
court stated that "[w]hat would be lawful and reasonable in one case or in one
locality would be unlawful or unreasonable in another case or locality."
165. Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Meinecke v.
Stallsworth, 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972); City of Fredericktown v.
Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McCon-
nell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951); Kelley v. National Lead
Co., 240 Mo. App. 47, 210 S.W.2d 728 (St. L. 1948); Schottv. Appleton Brewery
Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51
(K.C. Mo. App. 1931). These factors are generally accepted in other states. See
D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 160; W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.3.
166. A good discussion of the balancing test and its application can be found
in 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 103, § 1.24.
167. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
168. The Restatement weighs these factors and imposes liability when the
utility of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm. Id. § 826. Several
enumerated factors determine the gravity of the harm. Id. § 827. The utility of
the actor's conduct is defined in § 828.
169. See text accompanying notes 234-54 infra for a fuller explanation in-
cluding the limits of this statement.
170. Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1955); Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d
384 (K.C. 1951).
171. 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973).
172. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 22.06 (1969 ed.).
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The factors which are discussed here do not represent an exhaustive
list of those which the courts use in determining whether a nuisance exists.
In the author's opinion, however, they are the factors most frequently con-
sidered and those which most often and heavily influence the outcome of
the lawsuit.
i. Gravity and Character of the Injury
The gravity and character of the interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of the plaintiff's land is the first factor considered in the balancing
test. It is well settled that all landowners must submit to those interferences
which are the natural and expected inconveniences of everyday life. 173 The
law of private nuisance protects only against interferences which would
offend the normal person of ordinary sensibilities and does not recognize
insensible and insubstantial discomforts, trifling annoyances, or those in-
terferences which are fanciful or imaginary.1 74 An individual peculiarly
susceptible to injury cannot complain of that which would not injure an
ordinary person. 175 It is generally accepted, for example, that a landowner
has the right to mow the grass on his land and that nearby landowners
must submit to the annoyance incident thereto.1 76 Likewise, it is not
unreasonable for one landowner to cook on an outdoor charcoal grill even
though a small amount of smoke may drift onto adjoining land.177
As the gravity and character of the interference with adjoining land in-
creases, the reasonableness of the actor's conduct correspondingly
decreases.178 In Meinecke v. Stallsworth179 the court held that it was not
unreasonable for a rural landowner to maintain a pig farm. However, in
Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 180 the court held that it was unreasonable to
maintain 3,860 hogs which emitted 23,000 gallons of liquid waste per day,
thereby vastly exceeding the capacity of three sewage lagoons, and causing
a severe interference with nearby land. Likewise, under the common
enemy doctrine, it is not unreasonable for a landowner to ward off surface
173. Street v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (En Banc 1927); Fuchs v.
Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
174. Fuchs v. Curan Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1955); Beckley v. Skroh, 19 Mo. App. 75 (K.C. 1885). See also W.
RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.3; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, comment g
(1939).
175. See Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399, 416 (1942).
176. Professor Powell suggests that one who uses his land in such a manner as
to be peculiarly susceptible to harm is not entitled to recover. 5 R. POWELL, supra
note 5, § 705.
177. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
178. See Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951).
179. 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
180. 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).
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water onto an adjoining landowner's property. 81 However, in Hawkins v.
Burlington Northern, Inc. ,182 the court held that it was unreasonable, and
therefore a private nuisance, for one landowner to ward off surface water
in highly increased and destructive quantities so as to cause serious injury
to neighboring property." 3 In Blackford v. Heman Brothers Construction
Co., 1 4 the court held that it was unreasonable for one to conduct blasting
operations on his land so as to virtually deprive surrounding homeowners
of the use and enjoyment of their homes.
It has been suggested that courts may draw a distinction between those
interferences which cause physical injury or loss and those interferences
which merely cause aesthetic injury.18 5 In other words, a court will be more
likely to protect against sore eyes than against eyesores. 8 6 Hence, if one
landowner erects an unsightly statue in his backyard the courts may be
more reluctant to grant relief to an offended neighbor. Indeed, this
distinction may have some validity. An interference such as noise or odor
can be judged on an objective standard, and the court can reach a sound
decision as to whether a reasonable person would consider such an inter-
ference unreasonable. However, an activity which may offend good taste is
not so clearly unreasonable. Aesthetic values differ significantly from indi-
vidual to individual, and it is difficult for a court to say that a reasonable
person would be offended by the sight of such a statue in close proximity to
his home. One man's vulgarity may be another man's lyric. It is difficult to
state that an aesthetic interference rises to the level of a significant inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of land. One could of course conceive
of situations where the interference could be so substantial as to constitute
a private nuisance even though it resulted in no more than aesthetic inter-
ference. 8 7 If in the middle of a pleasant residential area one landowner
were to decide to collect old cars and junk and store it in his front yard, a
court might well conclude that the interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of surrounding residences was significant enough to constitute a
private nuisance, even though the interference were merely aesthetic.
181. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 160. But see note 98 and accompanying,
text supra (collection and discharge modification).
182. 514 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
183. In Freudenstein v. Heine, 6 Mo. App. 287, 290 (St. L. 1878), the court
stated:
But the right of the owner of a city lot to adjust the surface of his ground
to suit his convenience is governed by the general principle that a person
must not make such an unwarrantable use of his own rights as to serious-
ly obstruct those of his neighbor.
184. 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1908).
185. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5,§ 705.
186. See W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.4.
187. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 705.
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ii. Social Utility of the Conduct
When the interference with the plaintiff's land is less substantial, but
more than a mere trifling, the court should consider the second factor in
the balancing test, i.e., the relative social utility of each party's conduct.""'
Since different activities are accorded differing values in our society it is
appropriate to consider the relative merit of conduct in determining
whether it is unreasonably interfering with another.189 Some activities are
accorded very little social worth. The so-called spite nuisance, created
solely to interfere with the use and enjoyment of neighboring property, is
accorded very little social value' 90 and will most likely be classified as a
nuisance. 191 In Shellabarger v. Morris,9 2 the court enjoined the defendant
from screaming and beating on a variety of objects when done with the in-
tent to annoy the plaintiff. 93 Similarly, an activity which is unlawful will
be accorded very little social merit.19 4
It is generally conceded that the use of a residence for residential pur-
poses is an endeavor with extremely high social worth. 19- Courts have been
quite receptive to the notion that a man's home is his castle, 196 and have
been extremely protective thereof. This protectiveness is reflected in the
188. Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973). See also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
189. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
190. See Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (K.C.
1906).
191. The Restatement is in accord. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 829 (1939).
See also 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 705.
192. 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (K.C. 1906).
193. A more difficult problem exists, however, when the actor's conduct is
only partially motivated by malice. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 705.
194. See Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d
776 (En Banc 1928); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924);
Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594
(St. L. 1908).
195. See generally D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 160.
196. Some courts become extremely zealous in the protection of the home. In
Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Co., 231 Mo. App. 751, 763, 95 S.W.2d 837, 843 (St.
L. 1936), the court recited the following quotations:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake; the storms may enter-the
rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces
dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. William Pitt (Earl of
Chatam)-Speech on the Excise Bill.
Mid Pleasures and Palaces though we may roam, Be it ever so humble,
there's no place like home. John Howard Payne-Home Sweet Home.
In McCracken v. Swift & Co., 212 Mo. App. 558, 566, 250 S.W. 953, 955 (St. L.
1947), the court stated:
A man's home is his castle, and he should be as much entitled to protec-
tion against foul stenches, loud and unusual noises, and the torment of
flies which cause physical discomfort and suffering as against the armed
invader who would plunder and destroy.
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willingness of courts to treat certain activities as nuisances per se when
located in a residential area, even though such activities are considered
perfectly acceptable when located elsewhere.1 97 Missouri courts have uni-
formly characterized a funeral parlor as a nuisance when located in a
residential area without regard to its sanitariness or the manner in which it
is operated.198 Correspondingly, in Deevers v. Lando, 99 the defendant
operated a barbecue stand in close proximity to the plaintiff's home which
was located in a residential area. The stand was operated until a very late
hour of the night, interfering with plaintiff's nightly rest. The stand also
emitted a barbecue odor of which plaintiff complained. As a result, the
court enjoined defendant from operating the stand because of its effect on
plaintiff's home. A comparable result was reached in Lee v. Rolla Speed-
way, Inc. ,200 where the defendants operated a raceway near plaintiff's
home.
Even though a residence is not being interfered with, a court will con-
sider the significance of each party's conduct in a private nuisance action.
In Clinic & Hospital, Inc. v. McConnell,201 the defendant operated a
record store, complete with outdoor loudspeaker system, which disturbed
patients at plaintiff's hospital. There, the court accorded greater social
utility to the hospital and enjoined the defendant from operating his out-
door loudspeaker system in such a manner as to interfere with the peace
and tranquility of the hospital.
In Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc. ,2 the Missouri Supreme Court fol-
lowed the definition of social utility adopted by the Restatement of
Torts.2 08 The Restatement considers the following factors in determining
the social significance of a party's conduct: the social value which the law
attaches to the primary purpose of each party's conduct; the suitability of
each party's conduct to the surrounding area; and the impracticability of
preventing or avoiding the harm.
It is important to emphasize that the term "social utility" is a concept
which varies and fluctuates with the social mores and public interests of
society. In some measure, the creativity of an attorney and his ability to
f'md new arguments relating to social utility can be of great value. The at-
torney's ability to link his client's activity with the public interest, and to
downplay the relationship of his opponent's activity, is a critical factor. For
197. See text accompanying notes 155-61 supra.
198. Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940); Street v.
Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (En Banc 1927); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304
Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924). See also Scallet v. Stock, 363 Mo. 721, 253 S.W.2d
143 (1952). But see Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary, 363 Mo. 1137, 257
S.W.2d 609 (1953).
199. 220 Mo. App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (Spr. 1926).
200. 539 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
201. 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951).
202. 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973).
203. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 828, Comment on clause (a) (1939). 26
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example, given the current energy crisis, the social utility of activities seek-
ing to locate or develop energy sources might be greatly enhanced so that a
nearby landowner might be required to submit to greater inconvenience
and injury before a private nuisance is found to exist.
iii. Suitability of the Conduct to the Surrounding Area
The suitability of a party's conduct to the area in which it is located can
significantly affect the outcome in a private nuisance case.204 Deevers and
Lee indicated that a commercial establishment has very little social value
when situated in a residential area.20 5 A comparable result was reached in
Blackford v. Heman Brothers Construction Co. ,2o where the defendant
operated a rock quarry, with attendant blasting, in a residential area in
the heart of St. Louis. The noise and flying debris incident to the blasting
created a substantial interference with neighboring residences. Properly,
the court enjoined the operation of the quarry because it was unsuited to
the area in which it was located.
An activity will be accorded considerably less social worth when
located in an area to which it is unsuited. 20 7 A residence, although con-
ceded high social utility when situated in a residential area, can forfeit that
utility when located in an inappropriate area. 20 Accordingly, an inter-
ference which might be considered highly unreasonable in a residential
area might be the normal and expected incident of everyday life in an in-
dustrial area,20 9 and will not provide the basis for a private nuisance ac-
tion.21 0 In Leonard v. Gagliano,21 plaintiff lived in an area which was
204. W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.7.
205. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
206. 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1908).
207. See Powell v. Brookfield Pressed Brick & Tile Mfg. Co., 104 Mo. App.
713, 78 S.W. 646 (K.C. 1904). See also W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.7.
208. Leonard v. Gagliano, 459 S.W.2d 732 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970); Fuchs v.
Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955); Brad-
bury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594 (St. L.
1908). See also Bielman v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 151 (K.C.
1892).
209. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 160.
210. Leonard v. Gagliano, 459 S.W.2d 732 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970); Fuchs v.
Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955); Schott
v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947); Greene v.
Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931); Gibson v. Donk, 7 Mo. App. 37
(St. L. 1879). In Schott, the court stated:
Persons who live in cities or towns must necessarily submit, without legal
recourse, to the annoyances and discomforts which are incidental to city
(or town) life, and to the conduct of those trades and businesses which
are properly located and carried on in the neighborhood where they
reside, and are more or less necessary for trade and commerce and the
comfort and progress of the public at large.
205 S.W.2d at 920. The foregoing Missouri cases are in accord with the rule ap-
plied in the majority of states. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
211. 459 S.W.2d 732 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970).
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zoned and used for heavy industry. Trucks rumbled through the area at all
hours of the night, and trains clattered by on nearby tracks. Across the
street from plaintiff's dwelling, defendant maintained a trucking and
trash container service which commenced operation at three-thirty in the
morning. Defendant also mounted floodlights on top of his building to
protect against burglaries. Plaintiff, alleging that defendant's floodlights
and early hours of operation seriously interfered with his sleep, sought an
injunction to compel the defendant to operate his business in a reasonable
manner. The court denied plaintiff relief noting that one who resides in an
industrial area must submit to the noise and inconvenience incident
thereto. As a result, plaintiff deprived himself of the protection which
would normally be accorded to a residence by situating himself in an inap-
propriate area.
The suitability of the defendant's conduct to the surrounding area was
also important in Killian v. Brith Sholom Congregation.21 2 In Killian, the
defendant sought to locate a cemetery in an area near plaintiff's residence.
There were other cemeteries in the surrounding area, and the court em-
phasized the fact that plaintiff was aware of their existence when he pur-
chased his home. Accordingly, the court held that the cemetery would not
be unsuited to the surrounding area, and denied the injunction.
A parallel result was reached in Meinecke v. Stallsworth,213 wherein
defendant operated a pig farm in an area well suited to pig farming.
Although a number of landowners in the area kept pigs, and indeed plain-
tiff maintained cattle on his own land, plaintiff alleged that defendant's
pigs created offensive odors, noise, and generally gave rise to a rat-infested
condition. The court denied plaintiff's request for an injunction, noting
that defendant's conduct was well suited to the surrounding area and that
the interference with plaintiff's land was not substantial enough to justify
the issuance of an injunction.
As indicated earlier, courts can experience great difficulty in deter-
mining the character of the surrounding area. Although many areas can
be described as strictly residential or commercial, a large number of areas
are a mixture of commercial and residential. Even among areas which are
strictly residential or strictly commercial, there can be tremendous varia-
tions. For instance a commercial area might include retail businesses,
heavy industry, or a mixture of the two. In the final analysis, an important
battleground in any nuisance action will be the ability of the attorney to
characterize the area favorably to his client, and to emphasize the com-
patibility of his client's conduct to the area.
iv. Potential of Either Party to, Prevent or Minimize Injury
The Restatement of Torts considers in the balancing test the burden to
212. 154 S.W.2d 387 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
213. 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
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the person harmed of avoiding the harm.214 Individuals living in society
should, in certain situations, be required to make a reasonable effort to ad-
just the use of their land to compensate for the conduct of others.215 The
Restatement suggests, as an example, that one landowner might reason-
ably be expected to close his windows so as to minimize the interference
from noise and smoke drifting over from nearby property. 216 However,
several limitations should be placed on this concept. One who fails to take
reasonable steps to minimize interference from defendant's conduct
should not ipso facto be precluded from recovery; rather, his failure to
take such steps should be a factor to be considered in the balancing test. In
addition, this principle should only be applied when the defendant's con-
duct can be characterized as accidental. When the defendant's conduct
amounts to negligence or recklessness, liability should be imposed because
of the culpability of his conduct, even though plaintiff could have avoided
the injury.
Defendant's ability to avert the harm to plaintiff by using alternate
means should also bear on the reasonableness of the defendant's con-
duct.21 Even if defendant's conduct has significant social utility, and even
though the gravity and character of the injury to plaintiff are not severe,
and even though defendant may be conducting his activity in an appro-
priate area, his conduct might be deemed unreasonable if he can with
minimal effort eliminate the interference with plaintiff's land.
218 It must
be remembered, however, that a private nuisance will not be actionable
unless defendant creates a substantial interference with plaintiff's land. So
if defendant can eliminate such interference with trifling expense, it would
be appropriate to term defendant's conduct as unreasonable if he fails to
do so, notwithstanding other factors which might indicate that defend-
ant's conduct was reasonable.
v. Interrelationship of Factors
Ultimately, no single factor in the balancing test will be controlling in
every case. Rather, the significance of any one factor will be dictated by
the facts of each case and the relationship of the factors therein. Meinecke
is a good case to illustrate the interplay of the factors in the balancing test.
The court emphasized not only that plaintiff's injury was slight, but also
that defendant's conduct was well suited to the surrounding area. Accord-
ingly, after balancing the factors, the court held that the interference was
not unreasonable.
214. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 827, comment g (1939).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. § 830.
218. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 89.
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In Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc. ,219 the defendant operated a hog farm
in a rural area. The farm created a serious interference with the use and
enjoyment of the plaintiff's land by creating odors and polluting lakes and
ponds. The court characterized the defendant's conduct as unreasonable
apparently because of the substantial injury to plaintiff's land.
F. Basis of Liability
1. Introduction
Missouri law appears to be inconsistent with the majority view on the
issue whether a private nuisance action can be maintained without estab-
lishing that the defendant either intentionally or negligently interfered
with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. 2 0 Dean Prosser states
that the majority of states require that the defendant must have negli-
gently or intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's land, or have been
engaged in ultrahazardous activity. 221 This view is in accord with that
adopted by the Restatement of Torts222 and other commentators. 2 3 The
Restatement provides that substantial invasions of the use or enjoyment of
land will be actionable if plaintiff can establish that defendant's conduct is
substantial and unreasonable, or otherwise actionable under the rules
governing negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct. 224
It should be noted that it is far from clear that the majority of the states
actually do, 225 or should, require intent and/or negligence on the part of
219. 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).
220. See Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REv. 399 (1942).
221. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 87.
222. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939). The Restatement in § 825
defines an invasion as intentional when the actor either: "(a) acts for the purpose
of causing it; or (b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result
from his conduct."
223. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 705.
224. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939) provides:
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory inva-
sion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to the use or
enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules gov-
erning liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous
conduct.
225. See Davis, Groundwater Pollution: Case Law Theories for Relief, 39
Mo. L. REv. 117, 134-36 (1974). Another writer has suggested that the majority
of courts require that the defendant have acted intentionally, but do not require
negligence. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 160. But cf. T. COOLEY, TORTS
§ 399 (1879) (state of mind irrelevant).
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the defendant as a prerequisite to the maintenance of a private nuisance
action. 226 Several commentators take the position that certain injuries are
too great to be borne without compensation even if the defendant does not
act intentionally or negligently, and regardless of whether the activity he
engaged in was ultrahazardous. 227 This view has received some acceptance
by the tentative drafts of the second Restatement.228 Another writer stated
the same idea in a slightly different manner by concluding that one who
appropriates another's property for his own purposes should be required to
compensate the other therefor, regardless of the culpability of his
conduct. 22 9
Where the action is to enjoin offensive conduct, intent or negligence
should not be relevant. 230 An injunction is only issued when plaintiff can
demonstrate that there is a sufficient likelihood that defendant's conduct
will continue into the future. Almost invariably, plaintiff will have notified
defendant of the interference and requested that it be abated. If the
defendant continues his activity with knowledge that an appreciable inter-
ference with plaintiff's land is being created, intent has been estab-
lished. 23 I Even if intent or negligence cannot be established, the court
should issue an injunction if defendant's conduct creates an unreasonable
interference with plaintiff's land. Conversely, it may be appropriate to re-
quire intent or negligence when plaintiff seeks damages, since there are
significant policy questions whether defendant should be required to com-
pensate plaintiff for accidental interferences. 2 2 But when plaintiff seeks to
restrain defendant's future conduct, no more should be required than that
plaintiff establish that the defendant's conduct is unreasonable. 233
2. Missouri Law
Several early Missouri cases from the St. Louis Court of Appeals took
the position that negligence was a necessary element of a private nuisance
226. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 103, § 1.24.
227. See Davis, supra note 225, at 134-36. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, app. A at 132-41 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
228. There has been an attempt in the second Restatement to acknowledge
and reflect this view in proposed § 829A (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972):
Under the rules stated in §§ 826-828, an intentional invasion of another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable and the actor is
subject to liability if the harm resulting from the invasion is substantial
and greater than the other should be required to bear without compen-
sation.
229. See W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.3.
230. But see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, comment b (1939).
231. See id., § 825.
232. See text accompanying notes 256-57 infra.
233. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, however, proposes the requirement
that plaintiff establish that defendant's conduct was intentional, negligent, reck-
less or ultrahazardous before an injunction will issue. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 822 and comments (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
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action unless the offending conduct amounted to a nuisance per se. 234 In
Schindler v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana,23 . the court stated that a nui-
sance per se could be enjoined with or without the presence of negligence
because the nuisance inhered in the nature of the offending activity. The
court went on to note that a nuisance in fact could not be a basis for relief
absent a demonstration by the plaintiff that the defendant hadbeen negli-
gent 3 In Schindler,237 the court held that defendant was not liable for
the maintenance of a private nuisance when water from his pipes escaped
and damaged plaintiff's property. 238
Two more recent decisions from the Springfield Court of Appeals have
held that negligence, intent, and motive are all immaterial in the deter-
mination of whether a private nuisance exists. 239 Similarly, in Haynor v.
234. Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943) (dicta);
Davis v. Cities Service Oil Co., 131 S.W.2d 865 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939); Schindler
v. Standard Oil Co., 207 Mo. App. 190, 232 S.W. 735 (St. L. 1921); Griffith v.
Lewis, 17 Mo. App. 605 (St. L. 1885). See also Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51
(K.C. Mo. App. 1931). These cases are somewhat confusing. For example, in
Bollinger, the court cites Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, P., H. & W. Co., 129
Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. 1908), which took the position that the nature
of liability of one who maintains a nuisance is that of an insurer. In Davis, the
court cites both Schindler and Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d
485 (1932), in support of the proposition that negligence is not required in a nui-
sance action. However, the court fails to observe that Schindler and Pearson are
contradictory cases, and that the quote which it lifts from Pearson is contrary to
the proposition for which it is being cited. See also Griffith v. Lewis, 17 Mo. App.
605 (St. L. 1885).
235. 207 Mo. App. 190, 232 S.W. 735 (St. L. 1921).
236. The courts in these cases seem to be concerned with avoiding the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher. See Kelley v. National Lead Co., 240 Mo. App. 47, 210
S.W.2d 728 (St. L. 1948).
237. In Schindler, the court held that the leak in the water pipe did not in-
here in the nature of the pipe and, therefore, that the nuisance was the result of
defendant's failure to repair. Since the water pipe was not so inherently danger-
ous as to warrant the imposition of a duty to inspect, defendant could not be
negligent until he was notified of the defect and had a reasonable opportunity to
repair it. Chapman v. American Creosoting Co., 220 Mo. App. 419, 286 S.W.
837 (Spr. 1926), indicated that the holding in Schindler was limited to instances
of nuisance created by a hidden condition of which the defendant is unaware. See
also Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine and Its Standing in Missouri, 18
Mo. L. REV. 53 (1953).
238. In Jackson v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 219 Mo. App. 689, 284 S.W.
826 (St. L. 1926), the court made statements which indicated that it was follow-
ing the holding in Schindler and did not require a showing of negligence. The ac-
tivity, however, was improper operation of a steam shovel which did not appear to
meet the nuisance per se test which Schindler indicated was required before an
action could be maintained without establishing negligence.
239. White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); Clark v. City of
Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951). In Clark, the court held that
it was not improper for the trial court to strike defendant's jury instruction requir-
ing a finding of intent. In White the court cited J. JoYcE, LAW OF NUISANCES
§ 43, at 76 (1906), which states that negligence, motive and intent should all be
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Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co. ,240 the court indicated
that one who maintains a private nuisance is liable in the nature of an in-
surer. In addition, there are cases which say that the negligence of a
defendant is immaterial in a private nuisance action. 24'
Recently, in Hawkins v. Burlington Northern, Inc. ,242 the Missouri
Supreme Court faced the issue whether negligence was an element of the
cause of action for private nuisance. In Hawkins, the defendant railroad
had collected surface water and discharged it onto the plaintiff's land in
highly increased and destructive quanties. The court held that it is not re-
quired, in a private nuisance action, that the plaintiff establish that the
defendant's conduct was negligent. Rather, the court indicated that the
cause of action for private nuisance is similar to the action for trespass.
Presumably, this means that the plaintiff is required to establish intent in a
private nuisance action, but not the intent to interfere with the use and en-
joyment of the plaintiff's land. Rather, the plaintiff need merely establish
that the defendant intentionally did an act which happened to interfere
with the plaintiff's land.243
The area is somewhat clouded by the Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-
tion (MAI) on private nuisance. 244 In Missouri, it is reversible error for the
court to submit a non-MAI jury instruction when there is an applicable
immaterial in a private nuisance action. Joyce does, however, suggest the require-
ment that the defendant have some indication, even though remote, that an in-
terference with the plaintiff's property will result from his conduct.
240. 129 Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. 1908).
241. Blydenburgh v. Amelung, 309 S.W.2d 150 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958);
Divelbiss v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 272 S.W.2d 839 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954);
Lederer v. Carney, 142 S.W.2d 1085 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940); Vaughn v. Missouri
Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935). The foregoing cases
have cited public nuisance cases as authority for this proposition. E.g., Roth v.
City of St. Joseph, 164 Mo. App. 26, 147 S.W. 490 (K.C. 1912); Schnitzer v. Ex-
celsior Powder Mfg. Co., 160 S.W. 282 (K.C. Mo. App. 1912). The seminal
authority in Missouri for this proposition is the public nuisance case of Casey v.
Hoover, 114 Mo. App. 47, 89 S.W. 330 (K.C. 1905) (cited by subsequent courts as
Casey v. Wrought Iron Bridge Co.). The validity of relying on public nuisance
cases is somewhat dubious as the considerations are often different.
242. 514 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. En Banc 1974). It is interesting to note that the
court in Hawkins could have found intent on the part of defendant to interfere
with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land. The defendant continued to dis-
charge surface water onto the plaintiff's land despite numerous requests from the
plaintiff to abate the nuisance. Clearly, the defendant had knowledge that its
conduct was substantially certain to interfere with the plaintiff's land. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 825, comment b (1939).
243. But see cases cited notes 239-41 supra. It is interesting to note that
several older Missouri cases held that a successor is not liable for the continuation
of a nuisance unless he continues the nuisance with knowledge thereof or has been
notified of the nuisance and requested to abate it. See Rychlicki v. City of St.
Louis, 115 Mo. 662, 22 S.W. 908 (1893); Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875);
Martin v. City of St. Joseph, 136 Mo. App. 316, 117 S.W. 94 (K.C. 1909).
244. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 2206 (2d ed. 1969).
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MAI instruction. 245 This presents no substantial problem in that the
private nuisance verdict director itself is consistent with Missouri law, and
does not require that the plaintiff establish intent or negligence in order to
maintain a private nuisance action46 The committee comments to the
section, however, recite verbatim the Restatement of Torts comment
which requires that plaintiff establish either that the defendant's conduct
was intentional and unreasonable or that the conduct was negligent, reck-
less, or ultrahazardous. The comment also states that MAI No. 22.06 is
only to be used in those instances when the defendant's conduct is inten-
tional, which the committee defines, 24 7 again deferring to the Restate-
ment, 248 as an act done with the intent to interfere with the plaintiff's land
or an act which is substantially certain to interfere therewith.
It should be observed that the mission of MAI is to reflect and embody
the substantive case law on a particular subject.2 49 However, a reference to
the committee comments following MAI 22.06,250 and the personal notes
of the reporterJohn Divilbiss, 25 1 reveal scant authority for the proposition
that Missouri has specifically adopted the Restatement of Torts definition
245. Mo. R. CIv. P. 70.02(b), (c).
246. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 22.06 (2d ed. 1969) reads:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: First, plaintiff used his
property as a residence,' and
Second, (here describe nuisance...) and
Third, (describe the injury... [which] substantially impaired the use of
plaintiff's property) and
Fourth, such use by the defendant was unreasonable.
1. This should be omitted if not in issue.
Note that the verdict director does not expressly require that the defendant
have acted with the intent to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the
plaintiff's land. However, the committee's comment states that "the above in-
struction is intended to be used where the conduct is continued after the actor
knows that the invasion of plaintiff's rights is resulting so that subsequent inva-
sions, if found, would be intentional." The committee also states that "[T]he
above instruction is intended to cover only those cases where the invasion is inten-
tional and unreasonable."
247. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 22.06, Comment (2d ed. 1969).
248. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 825 (1939).
249. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. at XXIII (2d ed. 1969).
250. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 22.06, Comment (2d ed. 1969).
251. John S. Divilbiss served as Reporter for MAI from 1962 until his death in
1967. His unpublished notes cite Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo.
App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951) and Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r
Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955) as authority for the proposition that
Missouri has adopted the Restatement. In Clinic, the court cited § 822 of the
Restatement and listed factors for determining whether a private nuisance exists.
The court did not discuss whether intent and/or negligence are required in order
to maintain a private nuisance action. A subsequent case, Lee v. Rolla Speedway,
Inc., 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973), used the Restatement balancing test in a
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of nuisance including the requirement of intent and/or negligence. Argu-
ably, since MAI is adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court, then the
Restatement may now be the law in Missouri, and intent or negligence
may be required in a private nuisance action. However, Hawkins v. Bur-
lington Northern, Inc. 25 2 was decided nine years after the adoption of
MAI and held that negligence is not required in a private nuisance action.
Hawkins did not discuss the requirement of intent.
An additional problem with MAI 22.06 is that the committee com-
ments state that the verdict director itself is only to be used in cases where
the nuisance has been created with the intent to interfere with the use and
enjoyment of land. This statement presents a dilemma if private nuisance
cases are actionable without intent. The verdict director is appropriate
and a correct statement of the law of private nuisance as to those inter-
ferences which are intentional as well as to those which are unintentional.
If, therefore, counsel submits a not-in-MAI instruction for an uninten-
tional nuisance, 253 he is risking reversible error because he may be incor-
rectly stating the law of private nuisance. If he uses MAI 22.06, on the
other hand, he may have committed reversible error because he has
violated a committee comment on the use of MAI. 25 4
3. Policy Considerations
It may be undesirable to require that plaintiff establish that defendant
has acted negligently or intentionally before he can recover on a private
nuisance theory.2 5 Clearly, if defendant's conduct is negligent, reckless or
ultrahazardous, then irrespective of nuisance law plaintiff is entitled to
recover for the injury. 25 6 So, in effect, the Restatement analysis states no
more than the principles which a court uses to determine liability for an in-
tentional interference with the use and enjoyment of land. The Restate-
ment adopts the position that accidental interferences with the use and
enjoyment of land are uncompensable, apparently for reasons of public
policy. Yet there are injuries which should be compensable on a private
nuisance theory even though they result from mere accident. For example,
let us presume that a fertilizer plant, due to an unforeseeable accident,
discharges chemicals into the atmosphere, thereby destroying a neighbor-
ing farmer's cattle herd. The farmer who has lost his entire herd of cattle
may have suffered more economic hardship from the disaster than he can
reasonably bear. Indeed, the farmer may have lost his entire income for
that year even though his debts continue to accrue. The issue is who should
be required to bear the loss. Clearly, the farmer has suffered severe
252. 514 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
253. This was done in Genova v. City of Kansas City, 497 S.W.2d 553, 558
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974), and the issue of its validity was not raised.
254. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. at LIII (2d ed. 1969).
255. See text accompanying note 257 infra.
256. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822(d)(ii) (1939).
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economic hardship, and, presuming that his cattle farm was located in a
suitable area, his loss has been through no fault of his own. It would ap-
pear to be more equitable in this circumstance to impose liability on the
chemical plant whose conduct, albeit unculpable, resulted in the injury.
A dilemma would be created if the requirement of negligence and/or
intent were completely abolished in private nuisance actions. Very few
commentators would seriously suggest that all unreasonable interferences
with the use and enjoyment of land should be actionable without regard to
the culpability of the actor. However, it would likewise be unreasonable to
absolve the actor of liability for all accidental interferences regardless of
the circumstances. Therefore, an appropriate solution might be to con-
sider culpability as one factor in the balancing test rather than following a
strict rule that accidental interferences are uncompensable. Hence, in
determining whether a defendant had acted unreasonably, so as to create
a private nuisance, the court would consider the social utility of each
party's conduct, the gravity and character of the injury to the plaintiff's
property, the suitability of each party's conduct to the surrounding area,
and whether the interference has been intentionally created. Whether the
defendant's conduct resulted from negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous
conduct would be of little import since, as discussed earlier, such inter-
ferences would automatically be actionable on other theories. 257 In addi-
tion, in determining whether an accidental loss is compensable, the court
might consider the relative ability of the parties to bear the loss or to insure
against the loss. If the actor is a corporation, the court might also consider
whether payment for plaintiff's injuries should be a necessary cost of doing
business and should be passed on to customers. All of these considerations
contribute to the ultimate decision as to whether plaintiff should suffer the
injury without compensation.
If the balancing test were altered to consider the culpability of the
actor it would work as follows: if the interference with plaintiff's land were
purely accidental, the defendant's conduct would not be presumed unrea-
sonable unless the gravity and character of the injury to plaintiff's property
is sufficiently great, or unless there is disproportionate social utility in
plaintiff's as opposed to defendant's conduct. The court might choose to
impose liability if the defendant's conduct were particularly unsuited to
the surrounding area. As the social utility of the defendant's conduct in-
creases, or the gravity and character of the interference decreases, then the
court should become more reluctant to impose liability. Rather, in such
event, the court might require that the defendant have intentionally inter-
fered with the plaintiff's land before it would impose liability. In any
event, the court could determine, based-on the circumstances, whether
liability should be imposed for purely accidental interferences with the use
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Returning to our cattle farm example, the court would begin by noting
the severity of the injury to plaintiff. Hence, unless the fertilizer plant had
social utility disproportionate to the farm, or unless the farm was par-
ticularly unsuited to the area in which it was located, the court would im-
pose liability. It should be observed, however, that liability for accidental
interferences would only be imposed when the injury suffered by plaintiff
is so great that it should not be borne without compensation. If our plain-
tiff lost only a few out of several hundred head of cattle, the court should
be quite reluctant to impose liability for an accidental interference. This
approach, although adopting the traditional reluctance to impose liability
for purely accidental interferences, allows recovery when the injury is so
severe that undue hardship would be visited upon plaintiff absent
recovery.
4. Proposed Restatement Section 829A
In the tentative drafts of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there is a
proposal to add new section 829A 2 8 which would partially adopt this posi-
tion. Liability would be imposed for an intentional.invasion of another
person's land if the harm resulting from the interference is substantial and
greater than the other should be required to bear without compensation.
Although this section does not incorporate the balancing test, it nonethe-
less imposes liability when the plaintiff suffers severe injury. There is one
pitfall in the Restatement analysis. Liability will only be imposed under
this new section if it can be established that defendant intentionally inter-
fered with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land. The Restatement
defines intent in section 825 as where one acts for the purpose of causing
the result or with knowledge that the result is substantially certain to
occur. 2 9 This language would not cover accidental invasions of land, and
the cattle farmers in my example would be without compensation.
This section may not, however, produce an appreciable change in the
state of private nuisance law as it has previously been defined by the
Restatement. Section 822 states that an intentional invasion of another
person's land is actionable if plaintiff can establish that defendant's con-
duct is unreasonable. The invasion is said to be unreasonable under sec-
tion 826 when the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's
conduct. 280 The gravity of the harm is defined in section 827261 and the
utility of the actor's conduct is defined in section 828.262 These latter sec-
tions merely state that, in determining the reasonableness of the invasion,
the court should consider the gravity and character of the harm, the social
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
259. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 825 (1939).
260. Id. § 826.
261. Id. § 827.
262. Id. § 828.
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utility of each party's conduct, and the suitability of each party's conduct
to the surrounding area. It would appear that section 829A produces little,
if any, change in this analysis. Before section 829A can be invoked, plain-
tiff must establish that defendant has created a substantial interference
with the use and enjoyment of his land. This correlates to the gravity and
character of the harm required under section 827. However, in order to in-
voke section 829A plaintiff must also establish that the injury is greater
than he should be required to bear without compensation. Section 829A
does not provide any ascertainable standards by which it can be determin-
ed that the injury reaches this plateau; 263 indeed, the proposed comments
suggest that the social utility of the parties' conduct should be irrelevant in
such a determination. It is submitted that the considerations of what the
parties do, where they do it, and society's reactions to their conduct will be
factors in a nuisance liability determination regardless of what guidelines
or tests are espoused. Even if the court purports to follow the test in section
829A, the importance of the traditional factors should not be underesti-
mated.
Indeed, private nuisance law is no more than a hodge-podge of factors
which the court weighs and balances to determine if the defendant's con-
duct is unreasonable. Before a court can reach a realistic determination
that an interference is greater than the plaintiff should be required to bear
without compensation, it should consider all of the traditional factors as
well as several more. First, the court should consider the relative financial
ability of the parties to bear the loss. Second, the court should determine
whether one party should realistically be expected to insure against the
loss. Finally, the court should also consider whether one party is in a posi-
tion to pass the loss on to the public at large as a cost of his product. Section
829A is vague and fails to expressly take these factors into account. It
would appear to be far more desirable to alter the balancing test and con-
sider all of these factors in the initial determination of whether particular
activity constitutes a private nuisance.
The illustrations following proposed section 829A are helpful to illus-
trate the results which would be reached under such an altered-balancing
test. Without mentioning the requirement of intent, one illustration states
that if a factory produces severe vibrations which cause ceilings to fall in
plaintiff's home the invasion would be sufficiently great to impose liabil-
ity.264 A second illustration states that a defendant's conduct is unreason-
able when his smelter emits sulphurous fumes which waft over plaintiff's
land and cause severe crop damage. 265 However, a third illustration states
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A, comments (Tent. Draft
No. 18, 1972).
264. Id. Illustration 1.
265. Id. Illustration 2.
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that a chemical factory which occasionally emits unpleasant odors would
not be liable under this section. 266
The first two Restatement illustrations and the cattle example involve
innocent defendants who have caused injury through no fault of their own.
It might be suggested that imposing liability in such a case would deter the
free use of land or entry into business, but in fact such a fear is unfounded.
Many other burdens, including extensive regulatory legislation, confront
one who begins a commercial enterprise. Conceding the importance of
business, public policy still imposes such restrictions. Nuisance liability
without intent or negligence should similarly be imposed where circum-
stances warrant.267 It is unlikely that such a rule would significantly deter
commercial ventures, given that past Missouri cases have gone as far as to
say that negligence is not required for nuisance168 and even that nuisance
may result in strict liability. 269
It should be noted that in the vast majority of private nuisance cases
the plaintiff will be able to establish that the interference with his land is
either intentional or negligent. 270 In the frequently occurring case of a
continuing nuisance with requests by the plaintiff for the abatement of the
nuisance, the continuing action of the defendant with knowledge of plain--
tiff's injury is sufficient to establish intent. 271
G. Additional Considerations
1. Coming to a Nuisance
a. General Rule
A number of additional factors can alter the application of the balanc-
ing test in a private nuisance case. In Missouri, 272 as in most states,2 73 it is
266. Id. Illustration 3.
267. Although it may be obvious, it should be observed that the defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are not available in a private
nuisance action. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 103, § 1.28.
268. See cases cited notes 239-40 supra.
269. See cases cited note 241 supra.
270. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 87.
271. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 825 (1939).
272. Hayden v. Tucker, 37 Mo. 214 (1866); Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co.,
205 S.W.2d 917 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947).
273. Lawrence v. Eastern Air Lines, 81 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1955); Hall v.
Budde, 293 Ky. 436, 169 S.W.2d 33 (1943); Ensign v. Walls, 323 Mich. 49, 34
N.W.2d 549 (1948); Forbes v. City of Durant, 209 Miss. 246, 46 So. 2d 551
(1950); Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568 (1876). See also Note, Remedies-
Enjoining a Nuisance-Damages to the Defendant As a Condition of Granting
the Injunction, 38 Mo. L. REV. 135 (1973). A minority of jurisdictions recognize
the defense of coming to a nuisance. Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 331
P.2d 539 (1958); Patton v. Westwood Country Club Co., 18 Ohio App. 2d 137,
247 N.E.2d 761 (1969). See also W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.8; 1 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 103, § 1.28; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 706.
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not a defense to a nuisance action to allege that the plaintiff came to the
nuisance of which he now complains. In Hayden v. Tucker,274 defendant
built a corral for jacks and stallions. Later that same year, plaintiff erected
a residence on his land quite near the corral. Plaintiff then sought to en-
join operation of the corral alleging that it created offensive odors and
noises, thereby unreasonably interfering with the use and enjoyment of his
home. Defendant argued that the corral predated plaintiff's use and occu-
pation of his land, and that plaintiff should therefore not be permitted to
complain of a nuisance when he voluntarily chose to construct his dwelling
house beside it with full knowledge of its existence. The court held that the
mere fact that plaintiff came to the nuisance would not preclude him from
enjoining its operation. In a coming to the nuisance case, the court must
reconcile the interests of the defendant, who may have taken care to locate
his operation away from potentially offended neighbors, and the plaintiff,
who has a land interest unquestionably being infringed.
b. Proposed Solutions
There are several ways a court might resolve these interests. First, most
Missouri courts have recognized that the defendant's priority of occupa-
tion, although not a defense, should be considered as a factor in the
balancing test. 275 Accordingly, a court might weigh and balance the
defendant's priority of occupation with the other factors in its initial deter-
mination of whether the defendant's conduct does, in fact, result in a
private nuisance.
A second approach is that taken by the Arizona Supreme Court in Spur
Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. 2 76 In Spur, the defend-
ant constructed a feedlot fifteen miles from Phoenix, Arizona in 1956. In
1967, the plaintiff began constructing a retirement community in close
proximity to the defendant's feedlot; it subsequently brought a private
nuisance action against the defendant alleging that the feedlot created an
unreasonable interference to the community. The court determined that
the feedlot did, in fact, result in a nuisance, but conditioned its issuance of
an injunction on the plaintiff's willingness to indemnify the defendant for
the costs of moving. In so doing, the court allocated the burden between
both parties and avoided thrusting the loss solely on one or the other.
Missouri courts have in no discovered instance adopted this approach, but
it does appear to represent an acceptable solution to a difficult problem.
274. 37 Mo. 214 (1866).
275. Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1955); Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d 917 (St. L. Mo. App.
1947). See also Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236
S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App.
1931).
276. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). See also Note, supra note 273.
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The defendant in a coming to the nuisance case might also defend on
the theory that it has gained a prescriptive right to maintain the nui-
sance. 211 In Missouri, a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance can be
obtained if it is maintained adversely, 27 8 continuously, 27 9 notoriously2 8 0
and in the same general character 281 for the entire statutory period of ten
years. 28 2 A prescriptive right cannot be obtained when the nuisance is
unlawful,28 has been maintained permissively, 28 4 or when the interference
which flows therefrom is only periodic. 288 Accordingly, if the nuisance
conduct has been in operation for at least ten years, it may have gained a
prescriptive right to be maintained. 28 6
Missouri courts have been reluctant to hold that a particular defend-
ant gained such a prescriptive right.28 7 In Skinner v. City of Slater,28 1 the
defendant constructed a sewer in 1893 which was not put into operation
until 1903. The court held that the defendant had not obtained a prescrip-
tive right to pollute a stream merely by constructing the sewer in 1893,
even though it had been used by private individuals since construction. In
Schumacher v. Shawhan,2 9 the defendant purchased and operated a
277. See Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (Mo. 1899); City
of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17(St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Fansler v.
City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S.W. 1102 (K.C. 1915); Skinnerv. City of
Slater, 159 Mo. App. 589, 141 S.W. 733 (K.C. 1911); Bunten v. Chicago, R.I. &
Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 414 (K.C. 1892).
278. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899); McIlroy v.
Hamilton, 539 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); Stremph v. Loethen, 203
S.W. 238 (K.C. Mo. App. 1918); Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454,
176 S.W. 1102 (K.C. 1915); Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128
Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594 (St. L. 1907).
279. Mcllroy v. Hamilton, 539 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976);
Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S.W. 1102 (K.C. 1915);
Stremph v. Loethen, 203 S.W. 238 (K.C. Mo. App. 1918); Bradbury Marble Co.
v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594 (St. L. 1907); Bunten v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 414 (K.C. 1892).
280. Mcllroy v. Hamilton, 539 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976);
Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 128 Mo. App. 589, 106 S.W. 594
(St. L. 1907).
281. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899).
282. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899); City of
Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Bunten v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 414 (K.C. 1892).
283. See 5 R..POWELL, supra note 5, § 706.
284. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899). See also City
of Chillicothe v. Bryan, 103 Mo. App. 409, 77 S.W. 465 (K.C. 1903).
285. See cases cited note 7 supra. But see Bunten v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
Ry., 50 Mo. App. 414 (K.C. 1892).
286. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 103, § 1.30.
287. This tendency is probably consistent with the approach adopted by
other states. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 706.
288. 159 Mo. App. 589, 141 S.W. 733 (K.C. 1911).
289. 93 Mo. App. 573, 67 S.W. 717 (K.C. 1902). See also Newmanv. City of
El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
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distillery which had been in existence for forty years, during which time it
had continuously dumped waste from its stillhouse into a stream. Subse-
quently, the defendant increased the rate of discharge to the point where
the stream became unfit for use. Plaintiff sought an injunction, and
defendant asserted the existence of a prescriptive right to pollute the
stream based on the fact that his predecessors had dumped waste into the
stream for forty years. The court held that the prior rate of pollution was
not unreasonable and did not render the stream unfit for use. Accord-
ingly, the court noted that defendant and its predecessors had exercised no
more than their riparian right to discharge refuse in reasonable amounts
into the stream. The court also held that such right was not sufficient to
give them a prescriptive right to subsequently pollute the water so as to
render it unfit for use.
2. Anticipated or Threatened Nuisances
a. General Rule
An additional problerr exists when a landowner seeks to enjoin a
threatened or anticipated nuisance. The court, in making its decision,
must rely on mere allegations as to the future impact of the defendant's
conduct. For example, one landowner may desire to use land to operate an
amusement park while a nearby residential landowner, who fears that the
amusement park will deprive him of the enjoyment of his home, may op-
pose construction of the park. The court must then speculate and decide
whether the park will in fact result in a nuisance.
In response to this uncertainty, the traditional rule, followed in
Missouri290 and the majority of states, 29 1 is that an anticipated nuisance
will only be enjoined if the anticipated or threatened injury is certain to
occur. Several Missouri cases have applied this rule. In Aufderheide v.
Polar Wave Ice &Fuel Co. ,292 plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction of an
icehouse which they claimed would create disagreeable odors. The court
applied the traditional rule that a prospective nuisance will be enjoined
only if it is "clear, certain, and free from all substantial doubt that the an-
290. Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 219 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776
(En Banc 1928). See also Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.
1970); Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286 S.W. 86
(1926); Rankin v. Charless, 19 Mo. 490 (1854); Symmonds v. Novelty Cemetery
Ass'n, 21 S.W.2d 889 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929); Holke v. Herman, 87 Mo. App.
125 (St. L. 1901); McDonough v. Robbens, 60 Mo. App. 156 (St. L. 1895). The
theory was well stated in Symmonds: "[T]he doctrine is almost 'universally
upheld,' that injunctions will not be granted to restrain a use of property which it
is claimed will create a nuisance unless the use to be restrained is ipso facto a
nuisance or the pleader charges must become one. .. "
291. See D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.7. See also H. WOOD, NUISANCES
§ 100 (1883).
292. 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776 (En Banc 1928).
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ticipated nuisance certainly and inevitably will result. '293 The court went
further to note that an icehouse is not considered a nuisance per se, and
could only become a nuisance if operated in an unreasonable manner. The
court held that since the icehouse was not yet in operation it would be im-
possible to determine whether it would be operated in an unreasonable
manner. Accordingly, the injunction was denied. 294 In McDonough v.
Robbens,2 95 plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction of a dairy which, as in
Aufderheide, it was alleged would generate disagreeable odors. As in
Aufderheide, the court adhered to the traditional rule, and denied plain-
tiff's request for an injunction.
The hesitance to enjoin an anticipated nuisance is based on a reluc-
tance to prevent an activity which may or may not be conducted in such a
manner as to actually constitute a nuisance. Restrictions on the use of land
are traditionally disfavored. 296 Additionally, since enjoining an antici-
pated nuisance is an equitable remedy, it is subject to the general equit-
able reluctance to act on mere conjecture.
b. Exceptions
The reluctance to enjoin an anticipated nuisance disappears when the
offending activity would result in a nuisance per se. 297 The threatened in-
jury will necessarily result regardless of the manner of conduct or care in-
volved with the activity, and the injunction is based on more than mere
speculation or conjecture. In Clutter v. Blankenship,298 it was held that
the operation of a funeral home in a residential neighborhood would result
in a nuisance without regard to the sanitariness or care with which it was
293. Id. at 785.
294. See also Van de Vere v. Kansas City, 107 Mo. 83, 17 S.W. 695 (1891).
There plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant city from constructing a fire house
near his property. Plaintiff feared that noise from the fire bell and odor from the
horses would interfere with the use of his property. The court, as in Aufderheide,
held that since a fire house was not a nuisance per se it would not be enjoined until
such time as it was actually in existence and could be shown to be a nuisance in
fact. Given the high social utility of a firehouse, it is unlikely that an injunction
would issue in any event. Plaintiff at best would be relegated to an action for
money damages.
295. 60 Mo. App. 156 (St. L. 1895).
296. In Holke v. Herman, 87 Mo. App. 125, 134 (St. L. 1901), it was stated
that:
The uncertainty of future events, the frequency of groundless alarms and
the despotism of needlessly preventing a citizen from using his property
in the mode he considers most conducive to his interest or pleasure have
properly made the courts extremely conservative in granting such relief
[against an anticipated nuisance].
297. See Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940);
Holke v. Herman, 87 Mo. App. 125 (St. L. 1901); McDonough v. Robbens, 60
Mo. App. 156 (St. L. 1895). See also D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.7; W.
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 90.
298. 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940).
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operated; the court held that an anticipatory injunction was proper even
though the home had not yet commenced operation.
It is nonetheless inaccurate to state that an anticipated nuisance will
only be enjoined in those circumstances when the offending activity is
classified as a nuisance per se, and not when the offending activity is classi-
fied as a nuisance in fact.199 It is also possible for a threatened nuisance in
fact to be enjoined. In Mason v. Deitering, ° ° for example, defendant
sought to erect a livery stable three stories high, seventy-five feet wide and
seventy-six feet long in order to stable sixty to seventy horses. Although the
stable was being constructed in violation of a municipal ordinance, the
court refused to characterize it as a nuisance per se. Plaintiffs, whose
homes were located within thirty to two-hundred feet of the proposed
stable, sought and obtained an injunction by demonstrating that the
stable would almost certainly interfere with the use and enjoyment of their
homes. Even though the interference would have resulted in a nuisance in
fact and not a nuisance per se, its construction was enjoined because there
was a "reasonable certainty" that a nuisance would ensue.
A court might be more willing to enjoin an anticipated nuisance in fact
which is created with the intent to interfere with the use and enjoyment of
another's land. For example, in Holke v. Herman,30 1 defendant was con-
struing a pond with the announced intent to spite plaintiff for his refusal to
purchase defendant's land. The pond had no fresh water outlet and was
constructed in a location such that waste from defendant's livestock would
drain into the pond. The court held that defendant's intent should be con-
sidered in determining whether the threatened injury would result.
Several Missouri courts have indicated, as has the Restatement of
Torts,302 that less certainty of injury will be required to enjoin an antici-
pated nuisance which endangers health or life.303 When the anticipated
injury is to health or life, plaintiff need only demonstrate to reasonable
certainty that it will occur,3 0 4 rather than demonstrating that it is "clear
299. See D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.7.
300. 132 Mo. App. 26, 11 S.W. 862 (St. L. 1908). On similar facts, plaintiffs
in Caskey v. Edwards, 128 Mo. App. 237, 107 S.W. 37 (K.C. 1908), sought and
obtained an injunction prohibiting the issuance of a building permit for a stable
on the grounds that it would constitute a nuisance.
301. 87 Mo. App. 125 (St. L. 1901).
302. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 933 (1939).
303. Symmonds v. Novelty Cemetery Ass'n, 21 S.W.2d 889 (K.C. Mo. App.
1929); Holke v. Herman, 87 Mo. App. 125, 142 (St. L. 1901).
304. The "reasonable certainty" test ii far from accepted law or uniform in
application. It has been applied in two other cases: Mason v. Deitering, 132 Mo.
App. 26, 111 S.W. 862 (St. L. 1908); CityofSpickardsvillev. Terry, 274 S.W.2d
21 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954). In Mason plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction of a
stable which did not involve a threat to health or life, and the test was applied. In
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and certain" to occur. In Holke, the court held that foul and stagnant
water would result from construction of the pond and would present a
danger to the health of plaintiff's family. Accordingly, the court held that
the lesser standard of certainty would be appropriate.
Recently, in Lee v. Rolla Speedway, Inc. ,305 the Missouri Supreme
Court developed a third exception to what it termed the "onerous burden"
imposed by Aufderheide under the "clear and certain" test. In Lee,
defendants sought to construct a raceway in close proximity to plaintiffs'
homes in an area which the court termed residential. The plaintiffs alleged
that the raceway would create noise, dirt, dust, and fumes thereby inter-
fering with their enjoyment of their homes. The court determined that it
was certain that the track would produce noise and that the sole issue was
whether the level of noise would be so great as to unreasonably interfere
with the enjoyment of plaintiffs' homes. The court held that since there
was no dispute that the raceway would create some interference with
plaintiffs' land, an injunction would be appropriate if plaintiffs could
demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that the raceway would result in a
nuisance. In essence, the test seems to be that if it is certain that a proposed
action will result in an interference with the use of plaintiff's land, an in-
junction may issue if it is only "reasonably certain" that the level of inter-
ference will meet the traditional unreasonable standard.
Even if a court refuses to enjoin an anticipated nuisance, it may enjoin
its subsequent operation which results in a nuisance. 30 6 In Lee, the trial
court refused to issue an injunction against defendant's construction of the
proposed raceway. During the time between the trial court decision and
the subsequent appeals, the raceway was completed and commenced
operation. The Missouri Supreme Court, although of the opinion that the
raceway should have been enjoined in the first instance, remanded the
case for reconsideration by the trial court in light of its actual operation.
Ultimately, the trial court determined that the actual operation of the
raceway resulted in a nuisance, and enjoined its operation. 30 7
An injunction against an anticipated nuisance in fact will not have the
same degree of finality as an injunction against an anticipated nui-
sance per se. In both instances, the injunction is issued because the nature
or scope of the proposed activity is such as will result in an interference
with the use and enjoyment of neighboring land. In the former instance
the defendant has the power to manipulate the circumstances so as to
make the interference more or less reasonable; in the latter case of an in-
junction against a nuisance per se the defendant has very little power to
manipulate the circumstances. Features of nuisance per se such as illegal-
ity or location in a residential area are simply not amenable to change by
the actor.
305. 494 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1973).
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The defendant does have the ability to manipulate the circumstances
when an injunction is issued against an anticipated nuisance in fact. He
can alter the scope or nature of his proposed activity so that it is no longer
reasonably certain to result in a nuisance. If the defendant in Mason v.
Deitering, for instance, decided to build a one story stable to hold fifteen
horses rather than the proposed three story structure to house sixty to
seventy horses, it might no longer have appeared to a reasonable certainty
that the anticipated nuisance would have resulted. The original injunc-
tion, if narrowly worded, may not have prohibited defendant from con-
structing and operating the smaller stable. Moreover, the defendant might
be able to argue that due to the change in circumstances enforcement of
the original injunction would be inequitable. Thus, the court might
reopen and reconsider the injunction based on defendant's manipulation
of the circumstances.
Even though an injunction against an anticipated nuisance in fact may
be less final than an injunction against an anticipated nuisance per se, the
original plaintiff will still gain an important procedural advantage if the
original injunction is reopened. In his original suit, plaintiff had the
burden of proving that the defendant's proposed activity would be reason-
ably certain to result in a nuisance. When the defendant reopens the in-
junction he will be obligated to prove that the changed circumstances
make enforcement of the original injunction inequitable.
Where it is clear that the defendant will be able to easily change the
scope or conduct of his proposed activity to render any interference rea-
sonable, the court of equity may refuse to grant an injunction against an
anticipated nuisance in the first instance. As in all equity cases, the
chancellor is loath to engage in futile acts.
3. Local Zoning Ordinances
a. General Rule
An additional consideration in private nuisance cases is the impact of
local zoning ordinances. In the majority of states, permissive zoning does
not preclude an activity from being classified as a nuisance,308 but does
preclude it from being characterized as a nuisance per se. This majority
view is proper because permissive zoning is intended only to authorize an
activity to be carried on in a particular area, not to be carried on in an
unreasonable manner. 30 9 In a few states, courts will refrain from enjoining
an activity which has been permissively zoned but will award damages if its
conduct results in a nuisance in fact.310
308. Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1960);
Salder v. Huls, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 283, 183 N.E.2d 152 (1961). See also D. DOBBS,
supra note 162, § 5.7; D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 162; W. RODGERS, supra note
3, § 2.10; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 103, § 1.28.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/8
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
Early Missouri cases were in accord with the traditional rule. In Sultan
v. Parker- Washington Co.,311 the court held that a local license to use
asphalt in the construction of streets would not authorize the defendant to
operate an asphalt plant in an unreasonable manner in close proximity to
the plaintiff's home. In Powell v. Brookfield Pressed Brick & Tile Manu-
facturing Co. ,312 the court held that a local license to operate a brick plant
did not authorize it to be conducted in an unreasonable manner.
In Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary Co. S13 however, the Missouri
Supreme Court sitting in division indicated that the presence of a local
zoning ordinance which permits the location of a funeral home in a
residential area would preclude enjoining a funeral home in such an area
based solely on its location. The court stated that the home could only be
enjoined if its operation were, in fact, unreasonable or unsanitary.314 This
statement appears to be in accord with the traditional rule which states
that the existence of a permissive zoning statute will transform a nuisance
per se into, at most, a nuisance in fact.
Earlier decisions by the other division of the Missouri Supreme Court,
and one decision by the Missouri Supreme Court En Banc, had reached a
somewhat different result. In Scallet v. Stock,3 15 Street v. Marshall,316 and
Tureman v. Ketterlin,317 it was held that the presence or absence of a local
permissive zoning statute is irrelevant in the determination of whether a
private nuisance exists. All three cases reached the conclusion that the
presence of a funeral home in a residential area would create feelings of
gloom and depression and seriously interfere with the use and enjoyment
of neighboring property. All three summarily rejected the defendant's
argument that a local permissive zoning statute would preclude the court
from enjoining the activity as a nuisance.
The holdings in Tureman, Scallet and Street are preferable to that in
Leffen. The courts should protect nearby residents on whom a funeral
home can have severe psychological impact.3 18 Nonetheless, a permissive
311. 117 Mo. App. 636, 93 S.W. 289 (St. L. 1906).
312. 104 Mo. App. 713, 78 S.W. 646 (K.C. 1904). The issue was also men-
tioned in Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1955).
313. 363 Mo. 1137, 257 S.W.2d 609 (1953) (Division 1).
314. In Leffen, id. at 1146, 257 S.W.2d at 614, the court stated:
It may be that, as a result of the enactment of a municipal zoning ordi-
nance, the maintenance and operation of the funeral home at its present
location is now lawful and proper. If so, our restraint of a common-law
nuisance (resulting, not from the operation but solely from the location
of the funeral home) would be improper and futile.
See also Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1955).
315. 363 Mo. 721, 253 S.W.2d 143 (1952) (Division 2).
316. 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (En Banc 1927).
317. 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924).
318. See cases cited note 155 supra.
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zoning statute may reflect the true character of an area; a change in per-
missive zoning ordinances may reflect a change in the character of the
area. Accordingly, this factor may alter the balancing test.3 1 9 In Scallet,
although the court rejected defendant's contention that the permissive
zoning statute precluded enjoining the operation of the home, it eventu-
ally held that the area was in reality commercial and not residential. The
court refused to enjoin the defendant from opening the home, properly
basing its decision on the actual nature of the locality rather than on the
presence of an permissive zoning statute.
b. Due Process Limitations
If Missouri should adopt the position that permissive zoning ordi-
nances have the effect of abrogating private nuisance actions, the state or
locality which passed the statute or ordinance might be required to com-
pensate affected landowners under the taking clause of the Federal Consti-
tution.3 20 In Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. ,321 the United States
Supreme Court held that, under the fifth amendment,3 22 a government
could not immunize private companies from private nuisance actions
without compensating affected landowners if the offending activity was
sufficient to amount to a taking of the defendant's property.3 23 In
Richards, the government had immunized a railroad from suit, and the af-
fected landowner suffered damage from smoke and fumes emitted by
defendant's locomotive.3 24 In Sultan v. Parker- Washington Co. ,s2r again
dealing with government licenses, the St. Louis Court of Appeals reached
a similar result applying Missouri law.3 26
The application of Sultan and Richards to local zoning laws is less clear
than in cases of specific immunization from suit. Since the government is
unable to grant a license to interfere with public property without com-
pensating injured landowners, it is arguable that the same result cannot be
319. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 162.
320. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Payne v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R.,
112 Mo. 6, 20 S.W. 322 (1892). See also D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 162.
321. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
322. The requirements of the fifth amendment are imposed on the states via
the fourteenth amendment.
323. See also Kimball v. Thompson, 70 F. Supp. 803 (D. Neb. 1947), rev'd,
165 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1948).
324. The court stated "[t]hat while the legislature may legalize what other-
wise would be a public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a
private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of private
property for public use." 233 U.S. 546, 553 (1914).
325. 117 Mo. App. 636, 93 S.W. 289 (St. L. Mo. App. 1904).
326: See also Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 302, 53 S.W. 907, 912
(1899), where the court stated: "Our Constitution declares that private property
shall not be taken or damaged without payment ofjust compensation. The Legis-
lature, therefore, could not, if it so intended, confer authority on a city to injure
private property for the public good without first paying the damage."
1979]
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accomplished via local zoning laws. Hence, if the offending activity results
in a private nuisance and the local zoning ordinance has the effect of
abrogating private causes of action for nuisance, it is within reason that an
action for compensation of a taking will lie.3 27
4. Sovereign Immunity
The taking clause also affects the relationship of private nuisance to
sovereign immunity. Traditionally, private nuisance has been an excep-
tion to the application of sovereign immunity in Missouri. 2 A govern-
mental entity which unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of
surrounding land has been subject to the same liability as a private in-
dividual. With the judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity in Missouri
in Jones v. State Highway Commission,3 2 9 the-Missouri Supreme Court in-
dicated that the legislature might preserve or reestablish the immunity.
Legislation, when and if enacted, may be so worded as to affect the prior
exclusion of nuisance actions from the protection of governmental im-
munity. If it is so interpreted, an injured plaintiff might still proceed





Courts can grant injunctions and/or damages as remedies for private
nuisances.3 3 1 When a court grants damages, the measure will vary
depending upon whether the nuisance is characterized as temporary or
327. For a general discussion, see W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.10.
328. Rodgers v. Kansas City, 327 S.W.2d 478 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959). See also
Pearson v. Kansas City, 55 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1932).
329. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
330. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 26 provides:
That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use with-
out just compensation. Such compensation shall be ascertained by a jury
or board of commissioners of not less than three freeholders, in such
manner as may be provided by law; and until the same shall be paid to
the owner, or into court for the owner, the property shall not be dis-
turbed or the proprietary rights of the owner therein divested. The fee of
land taken for railroad purposes without consent of the owner thereof
shall remain in such owner subject to the use for which it is taken.
See Bohannon v. Camden Bend Drainage Dist., 240 Mo. App. 492, 208 S.W.2d
794 (K.C. 1948).
331. Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943); Clutter v.
Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940); Baker v. McDaniel, 178 Mo.
447, 77 S.W. 531 (1903); Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1972); Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d
214 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
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permanent. The measure of damages for a permanent nuisance is the
depreciation in the market value of the land,332 while the measure of
damages for a temporary nuisance is the depreciation in the rental or use
value of the land. 333 When no rental value is involved, the plaintiff can sue
for the actual damages inflicted upon his land.3 3 4
Special damages for the inconvenience and discomfort suffered by the
plaintiff35 and his family336 are also recoverable in a private nuisance
action. In Schmidt v. Paul,337 plaintiffs were awarded damages of $5,000
because defendant had created a nuisance by allowing mud and surface
water to be discharged onto plaintiffs' land. Defendant alleged that the
damage award was improper because it included consideration of the ele-
ment of plaintiffs' inconvenience and discomfort rather than just loss of
rental or use value. The court rejected defendant's contention, noting that
in a nuisance action the plaintiff may recover damages for inconvenience,
physical discomfort, and any actual injuries suffered as a result of the
nuisance.
It is also possible to recover damages for loss of rental value and for
actual injuries inflicted on the property. In Krebs v. Bambrick Brothers
Construction Co. ,338 defendant's blasting created excessive noise which
prevented plaintiff from renting his premises. The blasting also caused
332. Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Downing v.
Dinwiddie, 132 Mo. 92, 33 S.W. 470 (1895); Rotert v. Peabody Coal Co., 513
S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484
S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972). See also Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No.
9.02 (West Supp. 1978).
333. Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875); Smith v. Kansas City, St. J. &
C.B.R.R., 98 Mo. 20, 11 S.W. 259 (En Banc 1888); Spain v. City of Cape
Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (St. L. Mo. App. 1972); Foncannon v. City of
Kirksville, 88 Mo. App. 279 (K.C. 1901). See also MO. APPROVED INSTR. No.
4.01 (1969 ed.).
334. McKee v. St. Louis, Keokuk & N.W.R.R., 49 Mo. App. 174 (St. L.
1892).
335. McCracken v. Swift & Co., 265 S.W. 91 (Mo. 1924); Schmidt v. Paul,
554 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof
Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S.W.2d 544 (K.C. 1929). InMcCracken, 265 S.W. at
92, the court quoted 4J. SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES 3890 (4th ed. 1916):
A plaintiff who occupies a home is not limited to the recovery of the
diminished rental value of it, but may be compensated for any actual in-
convenience and physical discomfort which materially affected the com-
fortable and healthful enjoyment and occupancy of his home, as well as
for any actual injury to his health or property caused by the nuisance.
336. McCracken v. Swift & Co., 265 S.W. 91 (Mo. 1924). See also Ellis v.
Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 63 Mo. 131 (1876).
337. 554 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977). Schmidt also demonstrates
that one in joint possession of property on which a nuisance is maintained can be
held liable for it, even though he has not participated in its erection, if he has
notice of it.
338. 144 Mo. App. 649, 129 S.W. 425 (Spr. 1910).
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physical injury to plaintiff's land when rocks were hurled onto the prop-
erty. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to recover for both injuries.
Special damages can also include lost profits. In Fuchs v. Curran Car-
bonizing &Engineering Co.,339 the defendant operated a coal testing plant
near plaintiff's tavern. The plant emitted gases which rendered the tavern
uncomfortable and unhealthful, thereby causing plaintiff's inn to suffer a
substantial decrease in patronage. The court held that plaintiff was enti-
tled to recover lost profits to the extent that they could be measured with
reasonable certainty.
2. Temporary v. Permanent Distinction
The distinction between a temporary and a permanent nuisance is im-
portant not only because it affects the measure of damages but also
because it affects the statute of limitations. 340 A temporary nuisance gives
rise to a new cause of action for each new injury which occurs to plaintiff's
property.34 1 Plaintiff is entitled to bring successive actions, but must in-
clude all damages which have accrued at that time.342 When the nuisance
is permanent, the statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon
the creation of the nuisance and plaintiff must sue to recover all damages,
present and prospective, in one action. 343 Even if the nuisance is perma-
nent, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff's
land sustains injury or it is obvious that it will sustain injury. 344 In Webb v.
339. 279 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
340. Powers v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 158 Mo. 87, 57 S.W. 1090 (1900);
Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972);
Webb v. Union Electric Co., 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C. 1949);
Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S.W.2d 571 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
341. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935);
Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931); Spain v.
City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Bartlett v.
Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Corp., 351 S.W.2d 214 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961). But
cf. Chappel v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (disapproving Kelly). In
Bunten v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 414 (K.C. 1892), the court
noted that if a temporary nuisance creates a continuing injury to the plaintiff's
land, then the statute of limitations for that injury would not begin to run until
the injury ceased. For example, if a temporary nuisance caused flooding of the
plaintiff's land for sixty-three days, the statute of limitations would not begin to
run for that injury until the end of the sixty-three day period when the nuisance
ceased.
342. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935).
343. See notes 340-41 supra.
344. Newman v. City of El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App.
1956); Webb v. Union Electric Co., 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C.
1949); Bunten v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 414 (K.C. 1892). In
Newman, the defendant constructed a sewer in 1903, but the plaintiff did not suf-
fer injury until 1952. The court held that even if the nuisance were labeled as per-
manent, the statute of limitation would not begin to run until 1952 when plaintiff
bore injury. In Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S.W. 1102 (K.C.
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Union Electric Co.,345 defendant constructed a major hydro-electrical
dam in 1931 approximately 114 miles downstream from plaintiff's prop-
erty. The dam resulted in a gradual backswell of water which raised the
general level of the Osage River. In 1935, heavy rains caused the river to
overflow and flood plaintiff's property. When plaintiff filed a private
nuisance action in 1945 alleging that he had suffered loss of crops ten years
before, the court held that although the dam was created in 1931, no
damage was done to plaintiff's land until 1935 and the statute of limita-
tions did not begin to run until that date.
The characterization of a nuisance as temporary or permanent also
affects the right of a successor in interest to maintain a private nuisance
action.3 4 6 If the nuisance is temporary or continuing, a successor will be
entitled to maintain a private nuisance action for injuries sustained after
he takes possession. If the nuisance is permanent the cause of action ac-
crues to the original owner of the land and his successor has no right to in-
stitute an action.3 47 In McKee v. St. Louis, Keokuk & Northwestern Ry. ,348
a month-to-month tenant was held to be entitled to maintain a private
nuisance action for flood damages which he sustained, even though the
nuisance had been created prior to his possession, because it was classified
as temporary and continuing rather than permanent.
Although it is clear that the distinction between a temporary and a
permanent nuisance is important, there is no litmus paper test by which a
court can determine whether a particular activity is temporary or perma-
nent.3 49 In addition, an analysis of the types of activities which have been
classified as temporary or permanent nuisances is of little value. Some
Missouri courts have held that a dam,3 50 a sewer,3"' and a railroad em-
1915), plaintiff's land was damaged immediately upon creation of the nuisance,
but the injury was at that time insubstantial. The court felt that it would be un-just to require a landowner to sue for permanent damages prior to the time at
which he could reasonably estimate the measure of his future damages. Accord-
ingly, since the nuisance only occasioned slight injury in the beginning, it was
characterized as temporary.
345. 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C. 1949).
346. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 706 (suggestion that temporary/perma-
nent distinction should be limited to the issue of damages).
347. Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1972); Hayes v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 177 Mo. App. 201, 162 S.W. 266 (Spr.
1914). See also McKee v. St. Louis, Keokuk & N.W.R.R., 49 Mo. App. 174 (St.
L. 1892).
348. 49 Mo. App. 174 (St. L. 1892).
349. See D. DOBBS, supra note 162. Inverse condemnation suits are also
possible for private nuisance damage. See Comment, Inverse Condemnation and
Nuisance: Alternative Remedies for Airport Noise Damage, 24 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 793 (1973).
350. Webb v. Union Electric Co., 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C.
1929).
351. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 182 Mo. 1, 81 S.W. 165 (1904).
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bankment 5 2 constitute permanent nuisances; other Missouri courts have
held that a dam, 35 3 a sewer, 354 a pipeline leak,355 stockyards, 35 6 and a
negligently operated factory357 constitute temporary or continuing nui-
sances. One case held that a coal mining operation which caused pollution
of a stream and damage to livestock was a temporary nuisance,358 while
another held that a hog farm which caused pollution of a stream and
offensive odors was a permanent nuisance.35 9
When a court is in doubt as to whether a nuisance should be labeled as
temporary or permanent, it will usually elect to treat the nuisance as tem-
porary and abatable thereby permitting the plaintiff to bring successive
actions for each injury.3 60 There are several justifications for this tendency.
First, the courts are reluctant to grant damages for future injury which
may not occur. 36' Secondly, the defendant has a legal obligation to abate
the nuisance if possible.3 62 Finally, the effect of permanent damages is to
grant the defendant an easement to interfere with the plaintiff's land, and
there is a reluctance to foist this easement on an unwilling plaintiff.3 6 3 In
all events, doubt as to whether the injury will continue will result in the
classification of a nuisance as temporary rather than permanent.
3 6
352. Hayes v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 177 Mo. App. 201, 162 S.W. 266 (Spr.
1914) (except where changed by statute).
353. Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875); Markt v. Davis, 46 Mo. App. 272
(K.C. 1891).
354. Flanigan v. City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962); Spain v. Ci-
ty of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Hillhouse v.
City of Aurora, 316 S.W.2d 883 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958); Clark v. City of Spring-
field, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951); Foncannon v. City of Kirksville, 88
Mo. App. 279 (K.C. 1901); Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo. App. 134 (K.C. 1896).
355. Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (Mo.
1931).
356. Bielman v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 151 (K.C. 1892).
357. Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19
S.W.2d 544 (K.C. 1929).
358. Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1961).
359. Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).
360. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935);
Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
361. Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875); Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau,
484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Northcutt v. Springfield Crushed
Stone Co., 178 Mo. App. 389, 162 S.W. 747 (Spr. 1914); Foncannon v. City of
Kirksville, 88 Mo. App. 279 (K.C. 1901); Markt v. Davis, 46 Mo. App. 272 (K.C.
1891). See also Kelso v. C.B.K. Agronomics, Inc., 510 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974).
362. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935);
Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931); Spain v.
City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
363. See authorities cited note 362 supra. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 162,
§ 5.4.
364. Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
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Missouri courts have developed a number of factors to aid them in
determining whether a nuisance is temporary or permanent, including
whether it is practical to abate the nuisance,3 6- whether the source of the
nuisance is physically permanent, 366 and whether the nuisance has been
negligently3 67 or intentionally created.3 68 The most important and often
cited factor is whether the nuisance is abatable. 369 If the nuisance arises
from a physically permanent structure,37 0 it is more likely to be classified as
permanent rather than temporary. In Webb v. Union Electric Co. ,371 a
major hydro-electrical dam was held to be as permanent as the ingenuity
of man could make it and was classified as a permanent and unabatable
nuisance rather than a temporary nuisance.
It should be noted that, to some extent, the issue of abatability involves
a question of legal permanence.3 72 No matter how physically permanent a
structure may appear to be, it is always within the court's power to order
that it be removed. Some commentators have suggested that abatability
involves the likelihood that a court will issue an injunction against an activ-
ity.3 7 3 Only where there is a compelling reason to deny an injunction is the
question of abatability relevant. There are a number of reasons why a
court might decline to grant an injunction, including the running of the
statute of limitations,3 74 the fact that plaintiff has requested damages
rather than an injunction,375 and general considerations of policy and
equity.3 76
The mere fact that the source of a nuisance is physically permanent
does not insure that it will be characterized as permanent and unabatable.
1972). See also Ivie v. McMunigal, 66 Mo. App. 437 (K.C. 1896); Bielman v.
Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 151 (K.C. 1892).
365. Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1972).
366. Webb v. Union Electric Co., 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C.
1949).
367. Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1972).
368. Id.
369. Flanigan v. City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962); Stewart v.
City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En Banc 1942); Shelley v.
Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931); Spain v. City of
Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
370. Powers v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 158 Mo. 87, 57 S.W. 1090 (1900).
371. 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C. 1949).
372. See D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.4.
373. It has been noted that a two-fold test of permanence is followed in many
states: (1) the probability of the nuisance being continued is great; and (2) the cir-
cumstances are such that the plaintiff cannot have an injunction for its abate-
ment. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 5, § 706. This test, although possibly overly sim-
ple, does consider the legal abatability of the activity.
374. ' See text accompanying notes 340-46 supra.
375. If the plaintiff requests damages rather than an injunction the legal
abatability of the activity is not in issue.
376. See text accompanying notes 413-17 infra.
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The prevailing rule in Missouri is that even though the source of a nuisance
is physically permanent it should not be categorized as permanent unless
the nuisance is inherent in the nature of the physical object 7 7 Therefore,
if the nuisance arises from improper or negligent operation of a permanent
structure, the nuisance is considered to be temporary rather than perma-
nent.3 7 8 In Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp. ,379 defendant oper-
ated a roofing plant which polluted the air and water near plaintiff's home
and business. The court observed that the nuisance, although arising from
the permanent structure of the roofing plant, did not arise inherently from
the existence of the plant, but rather from the improper manner in which
it was operated. Accordingly, since proper operation of the factory would
abate the nuisance, it was labeled as temporary. A similar decision was
rendered in Shelley v. Ozark Pipeline Corp. ,380 where the nuisance was
caused by a leak in the defendant's pipeline. The court, as in Bollinger,
noted that an oil leak was not necessary to the operation of an oil pipeline,
and was therefore abatable. These cases can be contrasted to Webb v.
Union Electric Co. ,381 in which it was held that a hydro-electric dam which
necessarily caused the flooding of plaintiff's property was a permanent
nuisance.
An additional point of confusion in Missouri is whether the source or
cause of the nuisance must be permanent or whether a permanent nui-
sance can arise from a temporary source which creates permanent
injury. 8 2 Some older Missouri cases held that a permanent nuisance can
only exist when the source of the nuisance is permanent. 3 3 Some indica-
tion appears in more recent cases that a permanent nuisance can result
377. Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931);
Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S.W.2d 544
(K.C. 1929). See also Newman v. City of El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314
(Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
378. See Ivie v. McMunigal, 66 Mo. App. 437 (K.C. 1896); cases cited note
377 supra.
379. 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S.W.2d 544 (K.C. 1929).
380. 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931).
381. 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C. 1949).
382. See Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1972). Compare Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98,
19 S.W.2d 544 (K.C. 1929) and Hayes v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 177 Mo. App. 201,
162 S.W. 266 (Spr. 1913) with Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo.
1970) and Kelso v. C.B.K. Agronomics, Inc., 510 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974). See also Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d
214 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960). In Hayes, the court stated that permanency is deter-
mined by the permanency of the source of the injury. At a later point, the court
stated that a permanent nuisance can arise when either the source or the nature of
the injury is permanent. After six pages of discussion, the court concludes that the
whole discussion is irrelevant because a statute mandated that the railroad em-
bankment in issue be treated as temporary.
383. Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19
S.W.2d 544 (K.C. 1929).
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from a temporary interference which creates permanent injury.38 4 In dic-
tum, the court in Kelso v. C.B.K. AgronoMics385 held that the permanent
destruction of trees on the plaintiff's property, even if caused by a tem-
porary nuisance, would be classified as a permanent nuisance. In Bower v.
Hog Builders, Inc. ,386 plaintiff sustained injuries due to defendant's im-
proper operation of a hog farm, and the court held that permanent
damages were appropriate. Defendant maintained vastly inadequate
sewage lagoons resulting in a horrible stench and overflow onto plaintiff's
property. The nuisance appeared to be temporary since it was the result of
an excess number of hogs and inadequate sewage lagoon facilities. Accord-
ingly, it should have been remediable and not permanent. The court
treated the nuisance as permanent, probably based on the severity of the
damage to the plaintiff's land.
Even though an activity occasions only periodic interference with the
plaintiff's land, the nuisance will be considered permanent if the source of
the nuisance is permanent and the nuisance is inherent in its operation.3s 7
Although several older Missouri cases took a contrary position, the princi-
ple appears to be well established today. For example, in Webb the dam
produced a general rise in the Osage River near plaintiff's land, but plain-
tiff did not suffer actual damage except during occasional periods of heavy
rain. The court nonetheless held that the nuisance should be characterized
as permanent since it inhered in the nature of a permanent object.
There are a number of additional factors which might influence a
court's determination that a nuisance is temporary or permanent. A court
might be more inclined to classify a nuisance as permanent when the
offending activity is one which is important to the public welfare. A
number of cases have, for example, decided the issue of whether a public
384. In Van Hoozier v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 70 Mo. 145 (1879), the court
stated that the test of permanence is whether the nuisance destroys the entire
estate or the beneficial use thereof. The court relied upon H. WOOD, supra note
291, § 856. The examples cited by Wood do not, however, support a broad inter-
pretation of this statement. One example is a railroad embankment which im-
poses a continuous injury upon the land. This factual pattern would support a
conclusion that permanency is based on either the source or the nature of the in-
jury. The court in Van Hoozier held, however, that a temporary nuisance is
created when a permanent structure does only periodic and incomplete damage
to the entire estate. This holding would support the general proposition that it is
the nature of the injury and not the source which dictates whether a nuisance is
temporary or permanent. Other Missouri courts have also applied this test. See
Dickson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 71 Mo. 575 (1880). See also Babbs v.
Curators of State Univ., 40 Mo. App. 173 (K.C. 1890); Givens v. Van 8tuddiford,
4 Mo. App. 498 (St. L. 1877).
385. 510 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
386. 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).
387. Webb v. Union Electric Co., 240 Mo. App. 1101, 223 S.W.2d 13 (K.C.
1949); Hayes v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 177 Mo. App. 201, 162 S.W. 266 (Spr. 1913)
(except where changed by statute).
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sewer constitutes a temporary or a permanent nuisance. Where the im-
proper operation of a sewer cannot be abated within the available tech-
nology, it has been held to produce a permanent nuisance.388 Many older
Missouri cases held that a sewer amounted to a permanent nuisance on this
basis.As9 More recent cases have, however, recognized that modem scien-
tific processes can abate the odor from a sewer. If the sewer is susceptible to
a manner of operation which will not result in a private nuisance, any in-
terference will be treated as temporary rather than permanent. 390
Likewise, there are instances when a court will decline to grant plain-
tiff's request for an injunction in effect treating the nuisance as permanent
either because of the comparative adverse impact of the injunction on the
defendant, 391 or because of the impact of the injunction on innocent third
parties or the public in general.39 2 In denying plaintiff's request for an
injunction, the court is signifying that the comparative value of the defen-
dant's activity is such that it should be permitted to continue notwith-
standing the interference with plaintiff's land. Accordingly, the court
grants permanent damages, even though the nuisance may be temporary
and abatable, so that the activity can continue into the future unvexed by
the threat of future litigation.
When the facts permit, there is some tendency to allow the plaintiff to
elect whether the nuisance should be treated as temporary or perma-
nent. 393 Although some Missouri cases have held that it is reversible error
to submit a case involving temporary injury with a request for permanent
damages,3 94 if the facts would support either theory of damages the plain-
tiff may be allowed to elect his theory of recovery.3 95 Some courts seem to
have gone as far as to permit a request for permanent damages when a
388. Stewart v. City of Marshfield, 431 S.W.2d 819 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968).
389. Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En Banc
1942); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (En Banc
1939).
390. Flanigan v. City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962); Spain v.
City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Hillhouse v.
City of Aurora, 316 S.W.2d 883 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958); Newman v. City of El
Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956); Clark v. City of Spring-
field, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951).
391. See authorities cited note 429 infra.
392. See cases cited note 425 infra.
393. See Ruppel v. Ralston Purina Co., 423 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1968). See also
D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.4.
394. Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931).
But see Bielman v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 151 (K.C. 1892).
395. In Bielman v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 151 (K.C.
1892), the court held that stockpens constitute a temporary nuisance. However,
plaintiff requested permanent damages which were awarded to him. The defend-
ant did not object, and, on appeal, the court held that the defendant had waived
any right to object that permanent damages were awarded for a temporary nui-
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solely temporary injury is in issue. In Ruppel v. Ralston Purina Co.396
plaintiff submitted his case on a theory of permanent injury and the
defendant appealed, asserting error in that the injury was really tempo-
rary. The injuries sustained by plaintiff were as follows: the entire area, in-
cluding plaintiff's and defendant's land, had become infected with insects;
defendant's sewage lagoons gave off odors; and defendant's by-products
processing plant also emitted odors. Defendant asserted that the injury was
really temporary since the insects could be controlled by the use of insecti-
cides, the odor from the lagoon could be eliminated with sodium nitrate,
and the odor from the by-products plant could be eliminated. The court
observed that the defendant had attempted without success to alleviate the
odors from the by-products plant, and failed to give serious consideration
to defendant's arguments that it could eliminate the other interferences.
The court held that even though the case might more properly have been,
submitted for temporary rather than permanent damages, it was not pre-
judicial error to allow the case to be submitted on a permanent damage
theory.
It will seldom be proper for the court to allow the defendant to elect to
characterize the nuisance as temporary or permanent.3 97 Allowing the
defendant such an option would be tantamount to granting him the power
of eminent domain; he would be able to compel the plaintiff to sell an ease-
ment.3 98 Of course, where the defendant is a governmental entity with the
power to condemn an easement, permanent damages may be appropri-
ate.399 A court would eschew the futile act of awarding temporary damages
and merely forcing the government to initiate a separate condemnation
proceeding.
3. Punitive Damages
In addition to compensatory damages, it is possible in some cases to ob-
tain punitive damages for the maintenance and continuation of a nui-
sance. 400 In Bower v. Hog Builder's, Inc. ,401 defendant maintained 3,860
396. 423 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1968).
397. See Spain v. City of Cape Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d498 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1972).
398. D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.4.
399. See Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En
Banc 1942); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939).
See also D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.4.
400. Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Ruppel v.
Ralston Purina Co., 423 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1968); Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau,
338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935); Rotert v. Peabody Coal Co., 513 S.W.2d 667
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d
699 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935); Schumacher v. Shawhan Distillery Co., 178 Mo. App.
361, 165 S.W. 1142 (K.C. 1914); Krebs v. Bambrick Bros. Constr. Co., 144 Mo.
App. 649, 129 S.W. 425 (Spr. 1910); Laird v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 78 Mo.
App. 273 (St. L. 1899).
401. 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).
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hogs which emitted 23,000 gallons of liquid waste per day. Defendant
operated three sewage lagoons which proved vastly inadequate to contain
the waste. The waste spilled over onto plaintiff's property creating a foul
stench. The sheer volume of the waste caused fish to die in plaintiff's lake,
and a stream running through plaintiff's land became severely contami-
nated. Plaintiff's child was unable to invite friends over for recreation
because of the stench. Defendant, in spite of plaintiff's protests, refused to
abate the nuisance. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted suit and had defend-
ant's operation declared a private nuisance. Plaintiff was awarded $46,200
compensatory damages, and $90,000 punitive damages because the
defendant had acted with malice in maintaining the nuisance.
Malice, which is required to sustain an award of punitive damages, 40 2
is defined in Missouri as "the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without
just cause or excuse. '403 Intent can be established by showing either that
defendant intended to create the nuisance or that it was substantially cer-
tain to result from his act. In Rotert v. Peabody Coal Co.4 0 4 malice was
established by the fact that defendant continued his blasting operations
after learning that the blasting resulted in a serious interference with the
use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land. Punitive damages were also awarded
in Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co. ,405 where defendant continued
to maintain and operate a nuisance for three and one-half years following
notification by plaintiff and a request to abate. Similarly, in Ruppel v.
Ralston Purina Co. ,406 defendant overloaded to twice their capacity two
sewage lagoons which it operated in conjunction with a turkey processing
plant. The overloading resulted in a foul stench which seriously interfered
with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land. Despite plaintiff's numer-
ous protests and requests to abate the nuisance, defendant continued the
nuisance. The court found malice and awarded punitive damages because
defendant had intentionally created and continued the interference with
plaintiff's land without just cause or excuse.
An award of punitive damages must bear some reasonable relationship
to the actual damages suffered by plaintiff.40 7 However, a court may prop-
erly consider additional factors such as the degree of malice evidenced by
defendant, the age, sex, health and character of the injured party, and the
402. Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Ruppel v.
Ralston Purina Co., 423 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1968); Rotert v. Peabody Coal Co.,
513 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
403. Ruppel v. Ralston Purina Co., 423 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1968); Brown v.
Sloan's Moving & Storage Co., 296 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1956); Kelly v. City of Cape
Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1935). See also Mo. APPROVED
INSTR. NO. 16.01 (1969 ed.).
404. 513 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
405. 89 S.W.2d 699 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935).
406. 423 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1968).
407. Rotert v. Peabody Coal Co., 513 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
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affluence of the tortfeasor.40 8 For example, in Rotert v. Peabody Coal
Co. ,409 the court found a high degree of malice based on defendant's
round the clock blasting operations, continued despite plaintiff's protests.
In addition, the court noted that defendant had assets in excess of
$585,000,000, and held that an award of $32,000 punitive damages was
not inappropriate in conjunction with an award of $31,000 actual
damages. In Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc. ,410 an award of $90,000 punitive
damages was sustained in conjunction with a $46,200 award of actual
damages.
R. Self Help
Although it has received scant attention, the remedy of self-help is also
available to one affected by a private nuisance. The privilege of abatement
extends generally to entry upon the land of another and the use of reason-
able force to terminate the nuisance. Reasonable force does not include
conduct which results in infliction of personal injury upon another or con-
duct which amounts to a breach of the peace.4 1' One of the few Missouri
private nuisance cases to discuss the subject is Tanner v. Wallbrunn 4 2 in
which defendant's tree branches hung over onto plaintiff's property and
brushed against a building. The court denied plaintiff's request for an in-
junction, noting that such remedy should only be invoked in extraordinary
circumstances and that plaintiff had an adequate remedy of self-help in
that he could trim the overhanging branches. The court indicated that
this remedy of self-help would entitle plaintiff only to trim the overhanging
branches, and not to cut down the entire tree.
C. Injunctions
1. Equitable Limitations
A court might also grant an injunction as a remedy for a private nui-
sance. 41 3 The court could also award the plaintiff damages for injuries suf-
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1974).
411. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 90.
412. 77 Mo. App. 262, 266 (K.C. 1898).
413. City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 210 (8th
Cir. 1932), rev'd, 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174
S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943); Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119
(1940); Street v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (En Banc 1927); Hunt v.
Easley, 495 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); City of Fredericktown v.
Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Clinic & Hosp. v. McConnell,
241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. 1951); Deevers v. Lando, 220 Mo.
App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (St. L. 1926); Zugg v. Arnold, 75 Mo. App. 68 (St. L.
1898). It will ordinarily be necessary to join the holder of the fee if the nuisance
arises from land, unless his joinder is not necessary to a completedetermination of 60
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/8
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
fered up until the time of Suit. 41 4 There are, however, several limitations
upon the right to an injunction. One of these restrictions is that the is-
suance of an injunction is a matter within the sound discretion of the
chancellor who can refuse to grant the injunction and force plaintiff to ac-
cept monetary damages. 415 A second limitation is that an injunction
should not be issued on behalf of one who comes to an equity court with
unclean hands. 41 6 In addition, as with all equitable remedies, the injunc-
tion should not be invoked when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law. 41 7
A plaintiff in a private nuisance action might demonstrate the inade-
quacy of his legal remedy in one of several ways. First, plaintiff might
establish that, absent injunctive relief, defendant's conduct will continue
into the future and that plaintiff will be required to bring a multiplicity of
actions to enforce his rights.4 1 8 In Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture-
Local No. 170,419 the defendant union picketed the plaintiff's motion pic-
ture theatre over a labor grievance. Plaintiff successfully asserted the
inadequacy of his legal remedy by alleging that, unless an injunction was
the rights of the parties. Hunt v. Easley, 495 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1973).
414. Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875); Thompson v. Hodge, 348 S.W.2d
11 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961); Frick v. Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 488, 93 S.W. 351
(K.C. 1906).
415. Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943); Barber v.
School Dist. No. 51, 335 S.W.2d 527 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960). InJohnson v. Inde-
pendent School Dist. No. 1, 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d 421 (Spr. 1947), the
court stated: "The issuance or denial of an injunction is a matter that rests in the
sound discretion of the chancellor and ... may be denied even though plaintiff
has no adequate remedy at law."
416. Keller v. Devine, 550 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
417. Haydenv. Tucker, 37 Mo. 136 (1866); Schmidtv. Paul, 554 S.W.2d 496
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); Mason v. Deitering, 132 Mo. App. 26, 111 S.W. 862
(St. L. 1908); Scheurich v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W.
1003 (St. L. 1905); St. Louis Safe Deposit & Sav. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo.
App. 370, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903). The court in Tanner v. Wallbrunn, 77 Mo.
App. 262 (K.C. 1898), denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief because the
injury to his land was not substantial and plaintiff had the remedy of self-help.
418. Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226, 14 S.W. 746 (1890); Hayden v.
Tucker, 37 Mo. 136 (1866); Desberger v. University Heights Realty & Dev. Co.,
126 Mo. App. 206, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1907); Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo.
App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (K.C. 1906); Scheurich v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., 109
Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (St. L. 1905). The principle behind the exception
was well stated in St. Louis Safe Deposit & Sav. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo.
App. 376, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903): "[S]uccessive actions for damages may be
nearly or quite as much annoyance to the person who prosecutes them as the thing
to be abated; and the only effective way to deal with these aggressions is to
promptly stop them, unless the circumstances solicit measures less harsh."
419. 282 Mo. 304, 221 S.W. 95 (En Banc 1920).
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issued, the defendant union would continue picketing plaintiff's theatre,
forcing plaintiff to bring a number of actions to enforce his rights.420
There are several situations in which courts have been willing to
presume that the defendant's conduct will continue into the future not-
withstanding an award of damages. One is where the damages suffered by
plaintiff are nominal, and a money award to remedy them is insufficient
deterrent to defendant's future conduct. In Paddock v. Somes, 421 surface
water was discharged onto the plaintiff's land and caused nominal
damages; an injunction was held to be the appropriate remedy.
If defendant's conduct is undertaken solely to spite the plaintiff it is
also likely that even repeated damage awards will not cause the nuisance to
cease. An injunction was issued on this basis in Shellabarger v. Morris.422
Plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining chicken farms and were con-
stantly at odds because chickens from each farm would escape onto the
other farm. Due to the strained relations, defendant sought to annoy
plaintiff by screaming and beating on a variety of objects including tin
pans, fences and iron.
Plaintiff can demonstrate the inadequacy of his legal remedy by show-
ing that monetary damages will not adequately compensate him for the
injury which he has suffered or will suffer and that his rights can only be
properly protected by the issuance of an injunction. 423 In McNulty v.
Miller,424 the defendant operated a breeding barn for horses within sight
and hearing distance of plaintiff's home. The court issued the injunction
noting that the plaintiff suffered extreme disgust and embarrassment for
which monetary damages were not adequate compensation.
2. Justifications to Deny
a. Public Interest
Missouri courts have recognized that an injunction should be denied
when its issuance would seriously interfere with the public interest.4 25
420. If the Hughes case arose today, it is quite likely that the court would
reach a different result. Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970), the right of employees to engage in concerted activ-
ities for their mutual aid or protection has been federally protected. As a result, it
would appear to violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution to
use private nuisance theories to enjoin employees from exercising such rights.
421. 102 Mo. 226, 14 S.W. 746 (1890).
422. 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (K.C. 1906).
423. , See Deevers v. Lando, 220 Mo. App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (St. L. 1926);
McNulty v. Miller, 167 Mo. App. 134, 151 S.W. 208 (K.C. 1912).
424. 167 Mo. App. 134, 151 S.W. 208 (K.C. 1912).
425. Barber v. School Dist. No. 51, 335 S.W.2d 527 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960);
Johnson v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d 421
(Spr. Ct. App. 1947).
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Several Missouri cases have observed that, assuming that the interference
is not otherwise abatable, an injunction will not issue to compel a public
sewer to cease operation. 426 Likewise, in Johnson v. Independent School
District No. 1,427 the defendant school district maintained a septic tank in
conjunction with a school. The tank could not flow into a drain or sewer,
and the contour of the land dictated that any sewage must be discharged
onto the plaintiff's land. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the school from using
the septic tank on the theory that it was a private nuisance. The court,
although recognizing the inadequacy of plaintiff's remedy at law, refused
to grant the injunction because the septic tank was necessary to the opera-
tion of the school, and the school had no reasonable alternative to draining
the tank onto plaintiff's land.
428
b. Comparative Convenience Doctrine
Courts in most states will also refuse to enjoin a nuisance if the defend-
ant would as a result suffer injury disproportionate to that suffered by
plaintiff.42 9 This basis for denying an injunction is referred to as balancing
the hardships in granting an injunction, or the comparative convenience
doctrine. 4 0 A landmark case is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. ,41 a New
York case in which defendant was operating a forty-five million dollar ce-
ment plant which created dirt, dust, smoke and vibration, thereby in-
terfering with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land. The court,
although finding the existence of a private nuisance, refused to grant an
injunction because of the severe hardship which would be thrust upon
defendant. The court balanced the hardships and concluded that the in-
jury to plaintiff's land was insubstantial in comparison to the injury which
would be suffered by the defendant if the injunction were issued, and
determined that the equities of the case should be resolved against the is-
suance of an injunction.
There is uncertainty whether Missouri has adopted the comparative
convenience doctrine in private nuisance cases. Injohnson v. Independent
School District No. 1,432 the Springfield Court of Appeals indicated that
the comparative convenience doctrine should only be applied when there
426. See Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En
Banc 1942); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939).
427. 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d 421 (Spr. Mo. App. 1947).
428. The court observed that "it is generally held that if the injunction would
have the effect of greatly inconveniencing the public, it may be refused even,
though as against the defendant the complainant would be entitled to its issu-
ance." Id. at 755, 199 S.W.2d at 424.
429. See D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.7; D. HAGMAN, supra note 5, § 161.,
430. D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.7.
431. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
432. 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d 421 (Spr. 1947).
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is adverse impact on the public in general. 43 3 Several other Missouri cases
have, however, indicated that Missouri courts do balance the hardships
involved in granting an injunction. 434 In State v. Excelsior Powder Manu-
facturing Co. ,43 the court held that Missouri applies the comparative con-
venience doctrine in private litigation only when the injury suffered by the
plaintiff is trivial.43 6 In Scheurich v. Southwest Missouri Light Co. ,437 the
court balanced the hardships but nonetheless issued the injunction.
Even if a court does not expressly balance the hardships involved in
granting an injunction, it will usually consider the hardships at some point
in the litigation. The hardships can influence a court in its initial deter-
mination of whether a nuisance exists. In Meinecke v. Stallsworth,438
plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from keeping pigs. Plaintiff alleged
that the pigs created odors and generally interfered with the use and enjoy-
ment of his land. The court, however, noting that the injury to plaintiff
was slight, refused to characterize defendant's conduct as a private
nuisance and refused to grant what it termed the harsh remedy of an in-
junction.
c. Experimental Injunctions
As an alternative to balancing the hardships, a number of courts in
other jurisdictions have developed the "partial" or "experimental" injunc-
tion. 43 9 This device is usually an order to the defendant to alter or mini-
433. The court stated that mere economic hardship to the defendant would
be insufficient to invoke the comparative convenience doctrine absent an adverse
impact on the health and comfort of society.
434. Scheurich v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003
(St. L. 1905); Schaub v. Perkinson Bros. Constr. Co., 108 Mo. App. 122, 82 S.W.
1094 (St. L. 1904); St. Louis Safe Deposit & Sav. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo.
App. 370, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903).
435. 259 Mo. 254, 169 S.W. 267 (1914).
436. A number of Missouri courts appear to be, in effect, balancing the hard-
ships involved in granting an injunction. See Blackford v. Heman Constr. Co.,
132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1908); Sultan v. Parker-Washington
Co., 117 Mo. App. 636 (St. L. 1904). See also Meinecke v. Stallsworth, 483
S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
437. 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (St. L. 1905).
438. 483 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
439. See Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494
P.2d 700 (1970); Green v. Smith, 231 Ark. 94, 328 S.W.2d 357 (1959); Anderson
v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 229 (1952); McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907); Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Or. 624,
355 P.2d 229 (1960). See also D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.7 (1973). In Spur in-
dustries the defendant had been operating a cattle feedlot in a rural area for a
number of years when the plaintiff decided to construct a retirement housing
development in close proximity to the feedlot. Subsequently, the plaintiff sought
to abate use of the feedlot because it unreasonably interfered with enjoyment of
the residences in the development. The court decided to allocate the hardships
between both parties, ordering the defendant to move his feedlot to a new loca-
tion, but ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of the move.
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mize the interference with plaintiff's land. For instance, a court might
order a manufacturing plant to seriously curtail its nighttime production
to reduce interference with nearby homes. 440 Similarly, the court might
order a limit on the types of airplanes which use an airport. 44' In both in-
stances, the court is allocating the burden between the parties. Because of
the potential hardship to defendant, the court does not order him to cease
his activity entirely. Because of the interference to plaintiff's land, defend-
ant's activity does not continue unrestrained. Although Missouri courts
have not expressly adopted the concept of the partial or experimental in-
junction, the principle has been applied in effect in at least one private
nuisance case. In Greene v. Spinning4 2 the defendant operated a gas sta-
tion near plaintiff's home. Plaintiff, claiming that lights from defendant's
cars interfered with the use of his home, sought an injunction to compel
the defendant to either close or relocate his station. The court allocated
the burden between the parties by ordering the defendant to construct a
screen between the station and plaintiff's home to shield the interference.
The remedy was ordered over plaintiff's strenuous argument that the erec-
tion of the screen would itself constitute a private nuisance by blocking
plaintiff's home from its view and from cool summer breezes.
It is important to note that when a court refuses to grant plaintiff's re-
quest for an injunction, and compels him to take permanent damages in
lieu thereof, the court is in effect forcing plaintiff to sell the defendant an
easement in his land.443 The court dictates that plaintiff must accept per-
manent damages or be without a remedy, and allows the defendant to buy
a permanent license to continue his activity.
3. Defenses
a. Laches
Plaintiff's request for an injunction in a private nuisance action might
also be defeated by the equitable defenses of laches,444 estoppel, 445 acqui-
440. See Green v. Smith, 231 Ark. 94, 328 S.W.2d 357 (1959).
441. Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Or. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960).
442. 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
443. See D. DOBBS, supra note 162, § 5.4. See also Boomer v. Atlantic Ce-
ment Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 2.57 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
444. See City of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App.
1968); Blackford v. Heman Constr. Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L.
1908); Desberger v. University Heights Realty & Dev. Co., 126 Mo. App. 206, 102
S.W. 1060 (St. L. Mo. App. 1907); Scheurich v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., 109
Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (St. L. 1905); St. Louis Safe Deposit & Sav. Bank v.
Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App. 370, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903).
445. See Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931); St. Louis
Safe Deposit & Sav. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App. 370, 74 S.W. 474 (St.
L. 1903); Schumacher v. Shawhan, 93 Mo. App. 573, 67 S.W. 717 (K.C. 1902).
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escence, 446 or waiver. 447 Laches arises when a substantial amount of time
has elapsed during which the plaintiff has failed to enforce his right and,
due to the delay, prejudice has resulted to a defendant who acted on the
assumption that plaintiff did not intend to assert his rights. 448 Missouri
courts have been reluctant to apply the defense of laches to bar equitable
relief in a private nuisance action.449 This hesitance may stem in part from
the lack of availability of injunctive relief against an anticipated nui-
sance.45 0 Where plaintiff could not have had the anticipated nuisance en-
joined at an earlier time, the courts will not readily hold that he slept on his
rights by allowing defendant to proceed.
Laches was asserted as a defense in Blackford v. Heman Construction
Co. 451 when plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant from operating a
rock quarry near their homes. Although the rock quarry had been in
operation for nearly ten years, its operation had only become unreason-
able in the last two years. During the first eight years, defendant had in-
vested a substantial amount of money in the quarry. The court rejected the
defense of laches, noting that since a rock quarry is not a nuisance per se
plaintiffs would have been unable to enjoin its operation until it became
unreasonable. Accordingly, since defendant's substantial investment was
made at a time when the quarry was being operated in a reasonable man-
ner, and at a time when the quarry did not interfere with the use and en-
joyment of the plaintiff's land, the court held that plaintiff had not been
guilty of laches.
Laches was applied as a defense in Scheurich v. Southwest Missouri
Light Co.,42 wherein defendant's predecessor in interest constructed a
dam which flooded plaintiff's property. Plaintiff delayed for nearly five
years before seeking an injunction; in the interim, the dam had been sold
to defendant who purchased without notice of plaintiff's claim. The court
held that laches would bar plaintiff from seeking an injunction because it
would be unjust to permit plaintiff to enforce his rights against an inno-
cent successor. The court did, however, deny defendant's assertion of
laches as to a subsequent increase in the height of the dam.
446. See Blackford v. Heman Constr. Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287(St. L. 1908); St. Louis Safe Deposit & Sav. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo.
App. 370, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903); Schumacher v. Shawhan, 93 Mo. App. 573,
67 S.W. 717 (K.C. 1902).
447. See Thomas v. Concordia Cannery Co., 68 Mo. App. 350 (K.C. 1897).
448. See St. Louis Safe Deposit & Sav. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App.
376, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903). See also W. RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.9.
449. See Desberger v. University Heights Realty & Dev. Co., 126 Mo. App.
206, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1907).
450. See parts I(G)(2) & II(C)(2) supra.
451. 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1908).
452. 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (St. L. 1905).
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b. Acquiescence and Waiver
Acquiescence and waiver are based on the theory that plaintiff has im-
pliedly consented to defendant's maintenance of the nuisance by failing to
enforce his rights despite having knowledge of them. 453 Acquiescence was
asserted and rejected as a defense in Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocery Co. ,,s,
wherein plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from operating a parking lot
which created a private nuisance. Even though plaintiff had not filed suit,
the court held that he had preserved his rights by expressing his objection
to the parking lot in several heated arguments with the owner of the
grocery and by filing charges against its owner for violation of a municipal
ordinance. The key to acquiescence is a tacit expression of approval, and
failure to bring a court action is not of itself sufficient.
c. Estoppel
Estoppel arises when plaintiff acts, with full knowledge of his legal
rights, in such a manner as to induce the defendant to proceed detriment-
ally. In Greene v. Spinning,455 defendant built a service station near plain-
tiff's house. Plaintiff helped build the station and his wife occasionally
worked at the station. Subsequently, defendant's business increased to the
point where it substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of plain-
tiff's residence and plaintiff sought to enjoin operation of the station as a
private nuisance. Defendant argued that plaintiff should be estopped
from asserting his rights because he had participated in construction of the
station and otherwise acted in such a manner as to cause defendant to rely
on the expectation that plaintiff did not intend to enforce his rights. The
court disagreed, noting that defendant had not relied since he intended to
build the station whether or not plaintiff objected. The court also observed
that, at the time of plaintiff's acts, the station was not being operated in an
unreasonable manner. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff's prior
conduct could not estop him from objecting when the station was subse-
quently operated in an unreasonable manner. 4 6
4. Scope
Even though a court grants plaintiff's request for an injunction, the in-
junction should be no broader than is necessary to abate the nuisance. In
453. St. Louis Safe Deposit & Say. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App.
370, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903).
454. 231 Mo. App. 751, 95 S.W. 837 (St. L. 1936).
455. 48 S.W.2d 51 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
456. Estoppel was also rejected as a defense in St. Louis Safe Deposit & Say.
Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App. 370, 74 S.W. 474 (St. L. 1903). There was
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City ofFredericktown v. Osborn,'4 5 7 the defendant maintained a dog ken-
nel on her land which interfered with the enjoyment of surrounding homes
by creating noise and odor. The court, upon determining that the kennel
was a private nuisance, ordered the defendant not to maintain or keep any
dogs on her premises. On appeal, the court modified the injunction to per-
mit the defendant to keep one dog on her premises, noting that the origi-
nal injunction was unduly broad. The injunction, although designed not
to unduly restrict the defendant's conduct, may because of the circum-
stances completely prohibit the defendant from engaging in the offending
conduct. In Blackford v. Heman Construction Co. ,458 the defendant rock
quarry was enjoined from operating in such a manner as to jar the build-
ings on plaintiff's lot or to cause them to shake or vibrate. Since the quarry
could not be operated without causing such injury, the quarry was effec-
tively enjoined from operation.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the Restatement5 9 and the majority of states460 define a
private nuisance as any activity which unreasonably interferes with the use
and enjoyment of land, Missouri courts have over the years applied a varie-
ty of definitions. One definition states that a private nuisance is "anything
that worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage to the lands of another. ' 46
1
Another states that a private nuisance exists when one person "injures or
annoys another in the exercise of his legal rights."4 6 2 These definitions were
derived from Blackstone and are primarily of historical signifi-
cance today. A third definition states that the existence of a private nui-
sance depends on the "degree of danger existing with the best of care. ,463
Modem Missouri courts have, however, replaced the foregoing definitions
with the "unreasonable interference" definition followed by the majority
of states.464 In making the determination that a particular interference is
unreasonable, courts have followed the classic nuisance per se/nuisance in
fact characterization. 46 In the nuisance per se category, certain inter-
ferences may be characterized as unreasonable in and of themselves either
because they are illegal4 6 or because they are located in a residential
area. 46 Although no Missouri case has declared an activity a private
457. 429 S.W.2d 17 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
458. 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287 (St. L. 1908).
459. See note 2 supra.
460. See cases cited note 3 supra.
461. See cases cited note 11 supra.
462. See cases cited note 10 supra.
463. See cases cited note 12 supra.
464. See cases cited note 4 supra.
465. See text accompanying notes 151 & 165 supra.
466. See cases cited note 146 supra.
467. See case cited note 147 supra.
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nuisance because it is illegal, numerous Missouri courts have recognized in
dicta that an activity which is illegal can constitute a nuisance per se. 468
Missouri courts have also been reluctant to characterize an activity as a
nuisance per se because of its location, only one case so holding. 469 How-
ever, several Missouri cases dealing with funeral homes located in residen-
tial areas have in effect treated them as nuisances per se.470
The nuisance in fact classification encompasses those activities which,
although not necessarily a nuisance in and of themselves, become a nui-
sance because of the manner in which they are conducted.47 1 This charac-
terization of nuisance is used extensively under modem Missouri nuisance
law. The determination that a particular activity results in a nuisance is
based upon a variety of factors which the court weighs; included are the
social utility of each party's conduct, the suitability of each party's conduct
to the surrounding area, and the gravity and character of the injury. 472
A number of other factors will also enter into a court's determination
that a particular activity does or does not result in a private nuisance. First,
Missouri courts are reluctant to enjoin a threatened or anticipated nui-
sance until such time as it actually commences operation. 473 As noted
earlier, the law of private nuisance is designed to promote the free use of
land so long as such use is consistent with the rights of other landowners.
Accordingly, if a proposed activity may or may not result in a nuisance
depending on the manner in which it is operated, the courts will withhold
injunctive relief until such time as it actually does result in a nuisance.474 A
necessary corollary, however, is that if the threatened activity would result
in a nuisance per se, an injunction will issue since the activity cannot be
operated without creating a private nuisance.475 Missouri courts have fur-
ther developed a number of exceptions to the general prohibition against
enjoining an anticipated nuisance. A threatened nuisance which is being
created with the intent to interfere with the use and enjoyment of
plaintiff's land will be enjoined, 476 as will a threatened nuisance which
presents a danger to health or life. 477 A less frequently applied exception is
when the proposed activity will necessarily result in an interference with
plaintiff's land, but the court is uncertain whether the interference will be
substantial enough to result in a private nuisance.478
A second factor which may alter a court's analysis is the existence of a
468. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
469. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
470. See cases cited note 155 supra.
471. See text accompanying notes 142-45 supra.
472. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
473. See note 270 supra.
474. See notes 292-95 and accompanying text supra.
475. See cases cited note 297 supra.
476. See text accompanying note 301 supra.
477. See text accompanying note 303 supra.
478. See text accompanying note 305 supra.
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local zoning ordinance. In Missouri, 47 9 as in most states,48 0 a local permis-
sive zoning ordinance will not preclude a court from enjoining an activity
as a nuisance even though the ordinance specifically permits the operation
of the activity in a particular area. A court might, however, consider the
local ordinance as some indication of the true character of the area and
hence of the suitability of the defendant's conduct to the area. 48' The local
ordinance should not be controlling; if it were possible for a local zoning
ordinance to abrogate a plaintiff's right to maintain a private nuisance
action, serious federal and state taking clause problems might exist. 4 2
A third factor, defendant's priority of occupation, is generally no
defense to a private nuisance action in Missouri, 483 although it may be
taken into consideration in determining if defendant's conduct is unrea-
sonable. 4 4 If defendant has maintained the nuisance over a long period of
time it must be considered whether or not he has obtained a prescriptive
right to continue it. 4s5
In addition to the foregoing factors, there are two prerequisites to the
maintenance of a private nuisance action. In Missouri, plaintiff must hold
an interest in the land with which defendant is interfering before he is en-
titled to recover on a private nuisance theory.486 A mere occupant is not
entitled to recover for a private nuisance which interferes with his enjoy-
ment of the land.48 7 However, Missouri courts construe this interest in land
requirement very loosely so that an easement 88 or periodic tenancy48 9 is a
sufficient interest to entitle one to maintain an action.
It is an open question in Missouri as to whether negligence and/or
intent are necessary preconditions to the maintenance of a private nui-
sance action; the majority of modem cases indicate that they are not.490
However, the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions, relying upon the
Restatement, indicate that Missouri does require negligence or intent as a
necessary basis of liability.491 Although Missouri law appears to be some-
what confused on this issue, the modem and better view is that neither
negligence 492 nor intent4 93 should be required as a basis of liability in a
private nuisance action.
479. See cases cited notes 311-12, 315-17 supra.
480. See text accompanying note 308 supra.
481. See text accompanying note 319 supra.
482. See cases cited notes 320-27 supra.
483. See note 272 and accompanying text supra.
484. See cases cited note 275 supra.
485. See text accompanying notes 277-89 supra.
486. See cases cited note 122 supra.
487. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
4A8. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
489. See note 129 supra.
490. See cases cited notes 239-41 supra.
491. See cases cited notes 244-48 supra.
492. See cases cited notes 240 & 242 supra.
493. See cases cited notes 239 & 241 supra.
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The remedies for a private nuisance include damages,4 94 self-help498
and injunctions.496 In granting damages, the measure will vary consider-
ably depending upon whether the nuisance is classified as temporary or
permanent. Permanent damages will be based on the amount of deprecia-
tion in the value of the land resulting from the nuisance. 497 Temporary
damages, on the other hand, are based on the retail value which plaintiff
has lost due to the existence of the nuisance. 498 However, a variety of other
damages can be awarded incident to the compensatory damages4 99 and in
an appropriate case consequential damages can be awarded as wel.
The distinction between a temporary and a permanent nuisance is im-
portant not only because it affects the measure of damages but also
because it affects the statute of limitations 0 0 and the right of a successor in
interest to bring an action. 5 1 In the difficult task of classifying a particular
activity as temporary or permanent, it is clear that at the least some degree
of physical permanence is necessary, but that legal permanence involves
more than mere physical permanence.5 0 2 In determining whether a par-
ticular interference is temporary or permanent, the courts will consider a
variety of factors including whether the nuisance is physically perma-
nent,8 03 whether it is practical to abate the nuisance,5 0 4 and whether the
source of the nuisance is innocently, negligently or intentionally cre-
ated. 05 In some instances, the court might also consider whether the
plaintiff desires temporary or permanent damages.50 6
A court can also issue an injunction against a private nuisance. 0 7 The
use of an injunction is subject to the general limitations upon the use of
equitable remedies,508 as well as the equitable defenses of laches °5 0 9 estop-
pel,51 0 acquiescence5 ' and waiver.5 12 In addition, since an injunction is
based on the chancellor's sound discretion,5 18 he is empowered to deny it
494. See part II(A) supra.
495. See text accompanying notes 411-12 supra.
496. See part II(C) supra.
497. See cases cited note 332 supra.
498. See cases cited note 333 supra.
499. See text accompanying notes 33Y-39 supra.
500. See cases cited note 340 supra.
501. See cases cited note 347 supra.
502. See text accompanying note 372-76 supra.
503. See cases cited note 366 supra.
504. See cases cited note 365 supra.
505. See cases cited note 367 supra.
506. See cases cited note 368 supra.
507. See cases cited note 413 supra.
508. See text accompanying notes 415-17 supra.
509. See cases cited note 444 supra.
510. See cases cited note 445 supra.
511. See cases cited note 446 supra.
512. See cases cited note 447 supra.
513. See cases cited note 415 supra.
[Vol. 44
71
Weaver: Weaver: Law of Private Nuisance in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
1979] PRIVATE NUISANCE IN MISSOURI 91
when there would be an adverse impact on the public or third parties, 51 4 or
if the defendant would suffer unduly. 51 5
RUSSELL L. WEAVER
514. See text accompanying notes 425-28 supra.
515. See text accompanying notes 429-38 supra.
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